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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (2002 
Replacement Vol.). The court of appeals' decision, Hansen v. Evre. 2003 UT App 274, 74 
P.3d 1182, was issued on July 25, 2003. (Opinion, Addendum A.) The Utah Supreme Court 
granted certiorari on December 2, 2003. (Order Granting Cert., Addendum B.) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI 
Petitioners claim ten issues are on review. (See Br. of Petitioners at 1-2.) This Court 
has previously admonished, however, that on certiorari only the questions set forth in the 
petition for certiorari are properly before the court. See, e.g, DeBrv v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428, 
443 (Utah 1995) (explaining that the "grant of a petition for certiorari does not allow a second 
plenary appeal" and holding that an issue not presented in the petition for certiorari was "not 
properly before this Court" in case involving counsel for Petitioners); see also Coulter & 
Smith. Ltd. v. Russell 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998) (explaining the scope of certiorari 
review). Because Petitioners presented only three issues in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
(see Pet. for Writ of Cert., addendum E), only the following three issues are properly before 
the Court: 
I. Whether the decision of Hansen v. Eyre, 2003 UT App 274, 74 P.3d 1182. in 
which the court of appeals construed the Utah Traffic Control Act and held that a municipal 
ordinance was invalid because it conflicted with state statute, allowed Plaintiff Due Process 
as defined in Bouie v. Citv of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), and Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 
U.S. 451 (2001). 
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2. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals correctly held in Hansen v. Evre that Salt 
Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070 was invalid because it conflicted with the Utah Traffic 
Control Act. 
3. Whether the district court's order was properly before the Utah Court of 
Appeals for decision even though Salt Lake City, the municipality that enacted the ordinance, 
was not a party to the proceeding, and because the district court, according to Petitioners, did 
not expressly invalidate the ordinance.1 
Inasmuch as this Court did not specify on which of the three issues it granted 
certiorari, Respondents address all three. 
1
 The scope of certiorari is to review issues on which certiorari is sought and 
granted. This Court grants certiorari to review issues presented to it for review, not to 
permit a second appeal. Petitioners attempt to raise issues that were not included in any 
form in their Petition for Certiorari, and their attempts to reassign error to the trial court 
instead of to the court of appeals are improper and must be rejected by this Court. See, 
e.g.. Coulter & Smith. Ltd., 966 P.2d at 856. Issues 1 and 2 in Petitioners' brief raise the 
issue of Due Process. This issue was presented, albeit somewhat differently, as the first 
issue in the Petition for Certiorari and is therefore properly before this Court. Issue 3 in 
Petitioners' brief addresses whether Hansen v. Evre correctly held that the Salt Lake City 
Ordinance was invalid as in conflict with the Traffic Control Act. This issue was 
presented as the second issue in the Petition for Certiorari and is therefore properly before 
the Court. Issue 4 in Petitioners' brief questions whether the Court of Appeals properly 
invalidated the Salt Lake City Ordinance even though Salt Lake City was not a party. This 
issue was presented as the third issue in the petition for certiorari and is properly before 
this Court. The remaining issues set forth by Petitioners, numbered 5 through 10, were 
not presented in the Petition for Certiorari in any manner and therefore are not properly 
before this Court. DeBrv, 889 P.2d at 443. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals' decision for correctness, giving 
its conclusions of law no deference. See, e.g.. State v. Geukgeuzian. 2004 UT 16, ^|7, 494 
Utah Adv. Rep. 12; Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25,1J6, 44 P.3d 734. 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
Hansen v. Evre, 2003 UT App 274, 74 P.3d 1182, attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the court of appeals' interpretation of state legislation, the invalidity 
of a conflicting municipal ordinance, and the proper application of the court of appeals' 
decision to the parties before it. In Hansen v. Eyre, the Utah Court of Appeals construed the 
Utah Traffic Control Act and held that because a Salt Lake City ordinance conflicted with the 
Act, the ordinance was invalid. Because the court of appeals' opinion was predicable and 
reasonable, the opinion did not deprive Petitioners of due process, and the court correctly 
applied the law to the parties before it instead of applying the law only prospectively. 
The factual background of the case involves an automobile/bicycle accident at the 
intersection of 200 South and 500 East in Salt Lake City between Petitioner Tyler Hansen 
("Hansen") and Respondent Amanda Eyre ("Eyre"). Eyre, an employee of The Nature 
Conservancy ("Nature Conservancy"), had stopped at a red light on 500 East. Hansen, a 
bicycle messenger, was riding his bicycle east in a bicycle lane painted on the improved, 
asphalt surface of 200 South. Hansen had crossed the street in the middle of the block, west 
of the intersection, and proceeded to ride against the flow of traffic in the bicycle lane on the 
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left-hand side of the street instead of riding with traffic in the bicycle lane on the right-hand 
side of the street. Eyre, after stopping at the red light, was beginning a right-hand turn when 
she collided with Hansen who was in the bicycle lane but traveling against traffic. 
In the district court, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, both of 
which were denied. The district court held (1) that state statutory law clearly requires 
bicyclists to ride with, not against, traffic; (2) that Utah Code Section 41-6-87(3) was not an 
exception to this rule; and (3) that any city ordinance to the contrary purporting to permit 
bicyclists in a bicycle lane to ride against traffic is invalid. (See Dist. Ct. Minute Entry at 3, 
R. 164, Addendum C.) Hansen petitioned to appeal from this interlocutory order. This Court 
granted the petition and then transferred the case to the court of appeals. (See Order dated 
August 23, 2002, Addendum D.) 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court, holding that to 
the extent the Salt Lake City Ordinance permits a bicyclist to ride against the flow of traffic, 
it is invalid. Hansen v. Evre. 2003 UT App 274, ^ 4 & 15, 74 P.3d 1182. Before the court 
of appeals, Hansen asserted that Salt Lake City Ordinancel2.80.070 permitted him to ride 
against the flow of traffic if he was in a designated bicycle lane. Id at If 6. Eyre and Nature 
Conservancy argued that the Salt Lake City Ordinance was invalid as in conflict with state 
legislation because the ordinance purported to permit riding against traffic. IcL 
in its opinion, the court of appeals construed the Traffic Control Act Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 41-6-1 to -186 (1998 & Supp. 2002), as it pertained to bicycle traffic. The court explained 
that a bicycle constitutes a vehicle under the Act, and that bicycle paths on the area of 
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improved roadway are part of the roadway and subject to the limitations of the Traffic Control 
Act. Id at 1f 10. It then concluded that uSalt Lake City may not. . . allow bicycle riders to 
ride against the flow of traffic." Id at ^ j 10. Regarding Section 41-6-87 of the Act, the court 
of appeals construed subsection (1) to set forth a general rule requiring bicyclists to ride with 
traffic, as near as practicable to the right-hand side of the roadway. Id at f 11. It also 
interpreted subsection (3) to direct bicyclists to use a bicycle lane, instead of the roadway, 
w hen the bicycle path is adjacent to or separate from the roadway. Id at fflf 10-11. Moreover, 
the court read section 41-6-53, which directs that U4[o]n roadways of sufficient width, a 
vehicle shall be operated upon the right half of the roadway," to apply to bicycles. In sum, 
bicycles "must conform with the flow of traffic applicable to all vehicles." Id at f 13. 
Petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari on September 10, 2003, raising three 
issues: (1) whether the court of appeals' interpretation of the Traffic Control Act in Hansen 
v. Evre was contrary to Due Process as defined in Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 
(1964), (2) whether the court of appeals correctly held that Salt Lake City Ordinance 
12.80.070 was invalid because it conflicted with the Traffic Control Act as interpreted, and 
(3) whether the district court's order was properly before the Court of Appeals because Salt 
Lake City, the municipality that enacted the ordinance, was not a party to the proceeding 
pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-33-11, and because the district court allegedly did not 
expressly invalidate the ordinance. (See Pet. for Writ of Certiorari, Addendum E.) 
This Court granted certiorari on December 2, 2003, to review one or more of these 
issues. (See Order Granting Certiorari, Addendum B.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
First, the court of appeals' opinion did not deprive Petitioners of due process. The city 
ordinance was void from its inception because it conflicted with state statutory law. Pursuant 
to Supreme Court precedent on due process, the court of appeals' decision must be upheld 
because the court's conclusion that Utah state statutory law prohibits bicyclists from riding 
against the flow of traffic was not so unexpected or indefensible that it deprived Petitioner 
of fair warning. In fact, given the statutory provisions at issue, the court of appeals' opinion 
was predicable and reasonable. Because the opinion was not unexpected and indefensible, 
the court of appeals also correctly applied the law to the parties instead of applying the law 
only prospectively. 
Second, the Utah Court of Appeals correctly construed the Utah Traffic Control Act 
and correctly invalidated the Salt Lake City ordinance as in conflict with the Act. 
Third, the trial court's decision invalidating the ordinance was properly before the 
court of appeals for decision. Petitioners invited this alleged error, the matter was before the 
court of appeals pursuant to this Court's order, the district court invalidated the city 
ordinance, and Salt Lake City did not need to be a party to the lawsuit for the court to declare 
the ordinance invalid. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Hansen Was Not Denied Due Process Under Bouie v. Citv of Columbia, 378 U.S. 
347 (1964), and Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001). 
Hansen contends that by applying its decision in Hansen v. Eyre to him, the Utah 
Court of Appeals denied him due process as defined in Bouie v. Citv of Columbia, 378 U.S. 
347 (1964). He claims a constitutional right to rely on the plain language of the invalid city 
ordinance, and he claims that he did not have fair warning that riding his bicycle against the 
flow of traffic was proscribed by state law. (Br. of Petitioners at 16.) He maintains that the 
court of appeals' ruling denied him due process of law by criminalizing behavior that he 
claims was innocent when done.2 (Pet. for Cert, at 9, 16-20.) 
Hansen's argument fails. First, the city ordinance was void from its inception. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16 (1998 Replacement Vol.) Moreover, Petitioners misinterpret 
Bouie and its progeny that set forth the parameters of due process in the context of judicial 
decisionmaking. Under due process precedent, the court of appeals' decision must be upheld 
because the court's conclusion that Utah law prohibits bicyclists from riding against the flow 
of traffic was not so unexpected or indefensible that it deprived Hansen of fair warning. 
2
 Even though Petitioners refer to Due Process, they use language that is typical of 
cases that discuss the Ex Post Facto Clause. To the extent Petitioners are attempting to 
raise Ex Post Facto, the Ex Post Facto Clause and cases interpreting it are inapposite. Ex 
Post Facto applies only to legislative actions, not judicial decisions like the instant case. 
See, e.g.. Rogers v. Tennessee. 532 U.S. 451, 456 (2001) (explaining that the Ex Post 
Facto Clause w'is a limitation upon the powers of the Legislature, and does not of its own 
force apply to the Judicial Branch of government"). Therefore, controlling law on this 
issue is the Due Process Clause and cases interpreting that clause, i.e., Bouie and Rogers. 
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A. Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1) Was Void from its Inception 
by Operation of Law 
The Salt Lake City Ordinance was invalid at the time of the accident because, by 
operation of law, it was void from its inception. Petitioners insist that the Salt Lake City 
ordinance was valid until declared invalid by a Utah court. (Br. of Petitioners at 18.) 
Petitioners suggest that it was proper for Hansen to ride against traffic on the date of the 
accident because a court had not yet declared that the ordinance was invalid. This 
misrepresents the law. Pursuant to Utah state statute, the ordinance was void ab initio. Salt 
Lake City had no authority under the Traffic Control Act to pass Ordinance 12.80.070, an 
ordinance that conflicts with state law. 
Municipalities, as political subdivisions of the state, have no inherent power because 
they derive their powers from the State. See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Intervenorv. Mortier, 501 
U.S. 597, 607-08 (1991) (stating that it is well settled that local governmental units are 
created as agencies for exercising the State's governmental powers and that the governmental 
powers entrusted to local governments are granted in the absolute discretion of the State), and 
1 Antieau on Local Government Law § 3.01 (2d ed. 2000), cited in Kearns-Tribune Corp. v" 
Salt Lake County Comm'n, 2001 UT 55, Tf21, 28 P.3d 686. Because municipalities derive all 
of their powers from the State, "municipalities are wholly controlled by the state legislature, 
which can establish and abolish them, provide for their government, and prescribe their 
powers." Note, Conflicts Between State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances. 72 Harv. L. Rev. 
737,737-38(1959). 
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In the instant case, the Utah State Legislature specifically and expressly limited the 
powers of Salt Lake City with respect to municipal traffic ordinances, making the ordinance 
in question void ab initio. The Traffic Control Act includes an enabling provision that 
authorizes municipalities to pass laws regulating traffic, including the use of bicycles. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-17 (1998 Replacement Vol.) However, in the section prior to this 
enabling section, the Traffic Control Act expressly mandates that "[a] local authority may not 
enact or enforce any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions of this chapter." Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-16 (1998 Replacement Vol.) The ordinance at issue was void from its 
inception because it purported to permit what the Utah Traffic Control Act prohibits—riding 
a bicycle against the flow of traffic. 
It is well-settled that a municipal ordinance is null and void from the beginning if it 
is contrary to state law. See, e.g.. Hatch v. Boulder Town Council, 2001 UT App 55,1J16, 21 
P.3d 245 (holding that town ordinance was "invalid from its inception" because it was 
enacted in violation of the enabling statute); see also, e.g., Barrett v. State, 705 So. 2d 529, 
531-533 (Ala. Ct. App. 1996) (citing 6 McQullin, Municipal Corporations, § 20.14 (3d. Ed. 
rev. 1988), in explaining that a municipal ordinance is void if it conflicts with state statute, 
affirming defendant's conviction for gambling where gambling was prohibited by state statute 
but purportedly permitted by county ordinance, and rejecting defendant's contention that he 
was denied Due Process because his behavior had not been declared illegal by statute or the 
courts when undertaken); Village of Wilmette v. Michels, 485 N.E.2d 426, 427-28 (111. Ct. 
App. 1985) (holding that municipal ordinance was invalid because it conflicted with state law, 
9 
reversing conviction based on violation of invalid ordinance, and rejecting argument that the 
ordinance was valid at the time of the arrest); Phoenix Respirator & Ambulance Service. Inc. 
v. McWilliams, 468 P.2d 951, 952-53 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that municipal 
ordinance was invalid because it conflicted with state statute and holding that it was improper 
for the trial court to base a jury instruction on the ordinance in civil wrongful death trial); 
Young v. Citv of Seagoville, 421 S.W.2d 485, 486 (Texas Ct. App. 1967) (explaining that 
and ordinance was "born dead-void ab initio because it was in direct conflict with . . . 
constitutional and statutory provisions"); Citv of Springfield v. Stovall, 192 N.E.2d 72,72-74 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1962) (reversing conviction for violating city ordinance because ordinance 
was invalid as in conflict with state statute); Phenix Citv v. Putnam, 109 So. 2d 836, 837-38 
(Ala. 1959) (holding that traffic ordinance under which defendant was convicted was void 
from its inception as in conflict with state statute); Citv of Pelly v. Harris County Water 
Control and Improvement Dist. No. 7, 195 S.W.2d 241, 242-44 (Tex. Ct App. 1946) 
(affirming that a city ordinance to annex territory was void from its inception as without 
authority of law); Constant v. Brown, 114 P.2d 477, 478 (Okla. 1941) (reversing civil 
judgment because jury instruction was based upon a traffic ordinance that was void as in 
conflict with state statute); cf Black's Law Dictionary 1574 (6th ed. 1990) (defining void ab 
initio). An ordinance that is contrary to law and in conflict with state legislation is not merely 
voidable upon judicial challenge, but void ab initio as a matter of law.3 
3
 If invalid municipal ordinances were merely voidable at the option of a litigant, 
the legislature would be burdened with monitoring municipal legislation for illegal 
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Iii support of his argument that the ordinance was not void, but voidable upon judicial 
challenge, Hansen cites the following Redwood Gvm v Salt Lake County Commission, 624 
P2d 1138 (Utah 1981), Murray Citv v Hall 663 P 2d 1314 (Utah 1983), 56 Am Jur 2d, 
Municipal Corporations § 135 (2d Ed 1971), 6 E McQuillm, The Law of Municipal 
Corporations §20 41 (3ded 1980). and Regency Park L P v City of Toneka. 981 P 2d 256 
(Kan 1999) For the reasons outlined below, these authonties actually support Respondents' 
position 
No Utah Court has ever held that an ordinance that conflicts with state legislation is 
valid until declared invalid by a Utah court To the contrary, the Traffic Control Act 
mandates that such an ordinance is void ab initio Utah Code Ann § 41-6-16 (1998 
Replacement Vol ) ("A local authority may not enact or enforce any rule or ordinance in 
conflict with the provisions of this chapter ") The Utah cases cited by Respondents actually 
articulate the general pnnciple of law that supports Nature Conservancy's position that the 
ordinance was void ab initio, and therefore invalid at the time of the accident. In Redwood 
Gvm, the court upheld the long-standing pnnciple that "local governments may legislate in 
ateas previously dealt with by state legislation, provided the ordinance m no way conflicts 
ordinances and burdened with a duty to file suit to invalidate such ordinances Under 
Petitioners' view that an illegal ordinance would remain valid until a court declared it 
invalid, municipalities could theoretically pass an ordinance contrary to state statute, and 
then act based on the ordinance under the argument that the ordinance must be valid until 
declared invalid by a court Such a result makes little sense Instead, the law provides 
that municipal ordinances that conflict with state law are void as a matter of law from their 
inception 
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with state law (i.e., permitting that expressly prohibited by statute, or forbidding that 
expressly permitted by statute)." Id. at 1144. The court then held that a city ordinance 
prohibiting a masseuse from massaging a person of the opposite sex was valid because it was 
not in conflict with any state law. Id at 1145. In Murray Citv, the court quotes McQuillin 
for the general rule that "[ordinances are to be construed in the light of and in harmony with, 
applicable provisions of charter, state law, constitution, and public policy." Murray City, 663 
P.2d at 13 17 (quoting 6 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 20.41, at 102 
(3d ed. 1980)). Applying this principle, the court held that one state DUI statute amended 
another state DUI statute, and because Murray City had adopted the state DUI legislation as 
its municipal ordinance framework, the same was true for the city ordinances. Murray City, 
663 P.2d at 1318-19. Both of these Utah cases support the rule that a municipal ordinance 
which conflicts with state law is null and void from its inception. 
The non-Utah authorities also support Nature Conservancy's position that the 
ordinance was void ab initio. In Regency Park, the plaintiffs paid utility charges under 
ordinances that were later declared invalid. 981 P.2d at 258-59. The plaintiffs sought 
reimbursement of the charges, but the court refused. Id at 259. This was because the 
invalidity of the ordinance at issue "was not based on any reason making it void from its 
inception/' Id at 262. The court specifically noted that the decision was not that the 
ordinances were void, but that the fees were paid voluntarily, and not under protest. IdL at 
259-60. The instant case differs significantly because the ordinance was void from its 
inception as in conflict with state law. 
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In sum, a municipal ordinance is null and void from the beginning if it conflicts with 
state law. A party is not entitled to rely on an invalid ordinance until it is judicially declared 
invalid. In the instant case, because the ordinance conflicted with the Traffic Control Act the 
ordinance was void ab initio and invalid from its inception. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16 
(1998 Replacement Vol.) 
B. Hansen Was Not Deprived of Due Process Because Hansen v. Evre 
was Not so Unexpected or Indefensible that it Deprived Petitioner 
of Fair Warning 
Petitioners assert that Hansen was entitled to rely on the city ordinance because it 
purported to permit him to ride against traffic. Petitioners cite Bouie v. Citv of Columbia4 and 
argue that Hansen was denied due process because the court of appeals invalidated the 
ordinance and ruled that the state legislation prohibited him from riding against traffic. 
Petitioners insist Hansen had a due process right to rely on the plain language of the 
ordinance, even though it was void from its inception. (Br. of Petitioners at 16.) Pursuant 
to Bouie and its progeny, Petitioners' due process argument fails because the court of appeals' 
decision was reasonable and predictable, and not unexpected and indefensible. The court also 
correctly applied the law to Hansen instead of applying the law only prospectively. 
The United States Supreme Court placed due process limits on the ability of courts to 
retroactively apply judicial decisions in Bouie v. Citv of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), and 
4
 Noticeably absent from Petitioners' Brief is any reference to due process cases 
decided since Bouie, including Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001), in which the 
United States Supreme Court significantly clarified its holding in Bouie and further 
explained due process as it relates to the retroactive application of judicial decisions. 
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Rogers v Tennessee, 532 U S 451 (2001) The Court first held m Bouie that a judicial 
decision would violate the Due Process Clause if two conditions were present (1) the 
decision retroactively expanded narrow and precise language of a criminal statute, id_ at 352-
53, and (2) the judicial interpretation was so "unexpected and indefensible'' that the defendant 
was not on tair warning that the conduct at issue was a crime, id_ at 354 * In Rogers, the 
Supreme Court clarified the holding of Borne In Rogers, the Supreme Court first clarified 
that any limitations on judicial decisionmaking are based on the Due Process Clause, not the 
Ex Post Facto Clause, because the Ex Post Facto Clause "is a limitation upon the powers of 
the Legislature, and does not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of government" 
Rogers, 532 U S at 456 (quoting Marks v United States. 430 U S 188. 191 (1977)) The 
Rogers Court also identified the "basic principle that a criminal statute must give fair warning 
' In Bouie v Citv of Columbia, two African-American men were arrested for 
criminal trespass at a lunch counter Id_ at 348 The South Carolina criminal trespass 
statute prohibited an individual from entering land after he or she was notified that entry 
onto the land was prohibited The men were arrested, however, not for entering after 
being told entry was prohibited, but for refusing to leave after being asked to leave 
Notwithstanding, the South Carolina Supreme Court construed the statute so broadly that 
it also made criminal remaining on the premises after having been asked to leave Id. at 
348-49 The United States Supreme Court held that this decision violated due process 
First, the decision retroactively expanded narrow and precise statutory language that 
defined the crime of criminal trespass Id. at 355 The statute narrowly prohibited entry 
upon land after being told not to enter, and the court expanded the crime to include 
remaining on the premises after being asked to leave Id. Second, the South Carolina 
court's interpretation of the statute was so "unexpected and indefensible" that the 
defendants were not on fair warning that the conduct at issue was a crime The state 
court's construction of the statute was "clearly at variance with the statutory language," 
and it did not have even "the slightest support m prior South Carolina decisions " Id_ at 
356 
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of the conduct that it makes a crime,'1 and noted that deprivation of fair warning can result 
from a judicial decision that unforeseeably and retroactively expands a statute. The Court 
then explained that the South Carolina court's decision in Bouie violated due process because 
the state court's interpretation of the criminal statute was both "unexpected and indefensible 
by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct." IcL at 457 (internal 
quotations omitted).6 Rogers then held that the Tennessee Supreme Court's retroactive 
application of its decision in State v. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d 393 (Tenn. 1999), did not violate 
due process because the decision was not an unforeseeable, arbitrary decision that constituted 
an unexpected and indefensible departure from prior law. Rogers v. Tennessee. 532 U.S. at 
466-67. 
State courts presented with this issue have followed Rogers. For example, in State v. 
Redmond, 631 N.W.2d 501 (Neb. 2001), cert, denied, 534 U.S. 1033, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court upheld the retroactive application of a judicial decision in a capital murder case. In 
6
 In Rogers v. Tennessee, a defendant was convicted of murdering a victim who 
died fifteen months after the defendant stabbed him. 532 U.S. at 454. At the time of both 
the stabbing and defendant's conviction, Tennessee common law provided that no 
defendant could be convicted of murder unless the victim died within a year and a day of 
the defendant's act. Id. Notwithstanding, the Tennessee Court of Appeals still affirmed 
the conviction, holding that the year-and-a day rule had been abolished by statute. IcL at 
454-55. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed on alternate grounds, holding that the 
year-and-a-day rule had not been abolished by statute, but that it no longer existed at 
common law. IcL at 455. After explaining Bouie and the law on Due Process, the United 
States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Tennessee Supreme Court's retroactive 
application of its decision abolishing the year-and-a-day rule did not deny the defendant 
due process. IcL at 462. This was because the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision was 
not an unforeseeable, arbitrary decision that constituted an unexpected and indefensible 
departure from prior law. IcL at 466-67. 
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Redmond, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder. Id at 503. When the 
killing occurred, malice was an essential element of the crime. After the killing, a Nebraska 
Supreme Court decision. State v. Burlison. 583 N.W.2d 31 (Neb. 1998), overruled the prior 
Nebraska law and held that malice was no longer an essential element. Id In Redmond, the 
rule ofBurlison was applied retroactively, and the defendant was convicted of second degree 
murder without a finding of malice. Id On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, 
holding that the retroactive application of the new rule of the Burlison decision was not a 
denial of due process. After explaining the holdings of both Bouie and Rogers, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court stated that "a judicial decision interpreting a statute may be applied 
retroactively unless the decision denies due process by being both unexpected and 
indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue," 
and held that retroactive application of the Burlison decision was neither unexpected, nor 
indefensible. Id at 508 (emphasis in original). In other words, unless the court's decision 
is both unexpected and indefensible, it should be applied "retroactively" to the parties before 
the court. See id; see also, e.g.. State v. Brocuglio, 826 A.2d 145, 155-56 (Conn. 2003) 
(construing Rogers and explaining that a judicial decision that "deviates] from numerous 
cases by [Connecticut's] appellate courts" constitutes a sufficiently "marked and 
unpredictable" departure from prior precedent that is sufficient to violate due process). 
In sum, for a state court's interpretation and retroactive application of a statute to 
violate due process, the decision must (1) retroactively expand narrow and precise language 
of the statute, and (2) the court's interpretation must be clearly at odds with the plain language 
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of the statute and have no support in prior state judicial decisions such that the decision is 
both "unexpected and indefensible" such that the defendant was not on fair warning that the 
conduct at issue was a crime. See; Rogers, 532 U.S. at 458; Borne, 378 U.S. at 352-54; see 
also McDonald v. Champion. 962 F.2d 1455, 1458 (10th Cir. 1992) (explaining that before 
a judicial interpretation violates due process, the judicial decision must unforeseeably expand 
a criminal statute, and the construction must be both unexpected and indefensible); Redmond, 
631 N.W.2d at 508, cert, denied. 534 U.S. 1033. 
The second part of this test is dispositive. "Rogers sets forth a two-pronged test for 
whether retroactive application of a judicial decision violates due process, and both prongs 
must be satisfied for a constitutional violation to be proved. If one prong of the test is 
unsatisfied, then the inquiry can end." State v. Davlin, 639 N.W.2d 631, 641 (Neb. 2002). 
Due process has not been violated in this case because the court of appeals' decision in 
Hansen v. Evre was not so unexpected and indefensible that Hansen was not on fair warning 
that riding his bicycle against the flow of traffic was against the law. 
First the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Hansen v. Evre is not indefensible. To 
the contrary, the decision is predictable and well-reasoned. "Indefensible is defined as 
w
 incapable of being maintained as right or valid' or 'incapable of being justified or excused."' 
Redmond. 631 N.W.2d at 508 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 
Unabridged 1147 (1993)). For the reasons explained more fully in Section II below, Hansen 
v. Evre is certainly capable of being justified as correct First, the court of appeals logically 
concluded that a bicycle is a vehicle under the Traffic Control Act. Hansen. 2003 UT App 
17 
274 at 1| 9, 74 P.3d 1182. Then, the court rationally determined that where a bicycle lane is 
painted on the improved asphalt portion of a roadway, the bicycle lane is actually part of the 
roadway, not adjacent to it.7 Hansen, 2003 UT App 274 at fflf 9 & 12, 74 P.3d 1182. The 
court noted that Section 41-6-53 of the Act requires vehicles to be operated on the right half 
of the roadway, and it then reasonably interpreted section 41-6-87(1) to require bicyclists to 
ride on the right-hand side of the road and not "against the flow of traffic." Hansen, 2003 UT 
App 274 at ^ 10-11, 74 P.3d 1182 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-53). The court held that 
subsection (3) of 41-6-87, which provided that a bicycle riders must use a bicycle path when 
one exists adjacent to a roadway, was inapplicable because Hansen was riding in a bicycle 
lane that was part of the improved roadway. IdL at Tf 13. Finally, because the Salt Lake City 
Ordinance purported to permit a bicyclist to ride against the flow of traffic in a bicycle lane 
that was part of a roadway, the court declared the ordinance as in conflict with the Act and 
therefore invalid. Id, at f 15. Given this reasoning, the court of appeals' decision is far from 
indefensible. 
Moreover, Hansen v. Evre was hardly unexpected. Given the statutory definitions and 
provisions at issue, the decision was very predictable. Section 41-6-1(55) of the Traffic 
7
 The dissent disagrees, suggesting that where a bicycle path is painted on the 
improved roadway, the path is adjacent to the roadway. Hansen, 2003 UT App 274 at ^ 
18-20, 74 P.3d 1182. Based on this assumption, the dissent would have permitted the Salt 
Lake City Ordinance to stand and allowed bicyclists to ride against the flow of traffic in 
bicycle lanes painted on the improved portion of the roadway. Id at f^ 24. 
Notwithstanding this disagreement, the dissent acknowledges that "the majority opinion 
makes a persuasive case for affirming the trial court's decision." id at ^17, attesting to the 
fact that the majority opinion is rational, logical, and far from indefensible. 
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Control Act defines vehicle as uevery device in, upon, or by which any person or property is 
or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices used exclusively upon 
stationary rails or tracks." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-1(55) (1998), quoted in Hansen, 2003 UT 
App 274 at ^  9, 74 P.3d 1182. Unsurprisingly, the court concluded that a bicycle is a vehicle 
under the Act. The Act also defined roadway, as "that portion of highway improved, 
designated, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the sidewalk, berm, or 
shoulder, even though any of them are used by persons riding bicycles or other human-
powered vehicles." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-1(39) (1998), quoted in Hansen, 2003 UT App 
274 at 1f 9, 74 P.3d 1182. Given this definition, the court of appeals predictably determined 
that the bicycle lane painted on the asphalt surface in which Hansen was riding was part of 
the roadway. Id Further, the court predictably interpreted statutory sections of the Act to 
prohibit bicycling against the flow of traffic. Utah Code Section 41 -6-53 directs that vehicles 
must be operated on the right half of the roadway. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-53, quoted in 
Hansen, 2003 UT App 274 at ffif 10-11, 74 P.3d 1182. Section 41-6-87(1) also sets forth a 
general rule requiring bicyclists to ride "as near as practicable to the right-hand edge of the 
roadway." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87(1) (1998 Replacement). Subsection (1) sets forth three 
exceptions to this general rule permitting riding away from the right-hand edge, but none 
applied to the instant case. In light of these statutes, it is no surprise that the court of appeals 
held that bicyclists must ride with the flow of traffic on the right hand side of the road when 
a bicycle lane is painted onto the improved portion of the roadway. Because the Salt Lake 
City Ordinance purported to permit bicycling against the flow of traffic in a bicycle lane on 
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the roadway, the court of appeals held that the Salt Lake City Ordinance was invalid. IcL at 
*,fl[ 10, 15. Inasmuch as the court of appeals' decision predictably followed the statutory 
provisions in a logical, rational way, the decision is not so unexpected that it violated due 
process.8 
Under the test of Rogers v. Tennessee, the application of the court of appeals' 
interpretation of the Traffic Control Act in Hansen v. Evre to the parties before it does not 
violate due process because the decision is neither indefensible or unexpected. It makes sense 
that a judicial decision should be applied "retroactively," i.e., applied to the parties before the 
court, unless the decision is patently unexpected and indefensible. Judicial interpretation is 
necessary to our system of law. Moreover, "retroactive" application of judicial interpretations 
is also necessary and proper in our common law system. From the traditional perspective that 
s
 In his due process argument, Hansen also contends that "[t]he law certainly 
cannot expect a lay person to realize that there might be a conflict between a city 
ordinance that expressly allows bicycles in the left bicycle lane and a state law." (Br. of 
Petitioners at 20.) If this statement were the law, it would also be true, however, that 
Hansen did not even knew that the ordinance purporting to permit his conduct existed. 
Regardless, a fundamental principal of our justice system is that ignorance of the law is no 
excuse, and therefore citizens are deemed to be on notice of the law. See, e.g.. United 
States v. Int'l Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 562-63 (1971); United States v. 
Reddick. 203 F.3d 767, 770-71 (10th Cir. 2000); State v. Marshall, 2003 UT App 381, % 
18, 81 P.3d 775 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304(2) (1999), for the well-settled 
proposition that ignorance of the law is no defense). Moreover,"the law is full of 
instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly . . . . [and] the criterion in 
such cases is to examine whether common social duty would, under the circumstances, 
have suggested a more circumspect conduct" Nash v United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 
(1931). As a result, Hansen's alleged ignorance of the law is no excuse, he is deemed to 
have been on notice of the statute prohibiting his conduct, and he certainly had fair notice 
that crossing the street in the middle of the block and riding a bicycle against the flow of 
traffic is contrary to common, circumspect conduct. 
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judges "find" the law and apply it to the cases before them, retroactive application is rightly 
the norm. In our system, the courts are routinely asked to interpret and apply statutory 
language that oftentimes is unclear. The judiciary must have flexibility to interpret law and 
determine what the law is. At the same time, the judiciary must also be able to apply the law 
to the cases and controversies before it. If courts are not permitted to apply the law 
retrospectively, and only prospectively, they will be severely restricted in their ability to 
decide cases and controversies. If courts are limited to interpreting statutes and determining 
what the common law is without being able to apply that law as interpreted to the parties 
before them, our judicial system would be turned on end. Without retroactive application of 
the law, courts would essentially become lawmakers or intepreters of the law only for future 
cases, instead of resolvers of disputes in present cases. Indeed, retroactive application is 
necessary for courts to interpret the law and apply it to cases before it. In other words, if 
judicial decisions were not applied retroactively, "this would place an unworkable and 
unacceptable restraint on normal judicial processes and would be incompatible with the 
resolution of uncertainty that marks any evolving legal system." Rogers, 532 U.S. at 461. 
Accordingly, when judicial bodies "create" new law, the Due Process Clause prohibits 
retroactive application of "new" law that is unexpected and indefensible in light of prior 
precedent. However, where the judiciary acts within its power to interpret lawr or determine 
what the common law precedent is, due process does not prohibit retroactive application to 
the parties, especially when the interpretation is reasonable. 
As a result, the Supreme Court has "restricted due process limitations on the 
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retroactive application of judicial interpretations of criminal statutes to those that are 
uunexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the 
conduct in issue.'" Rogers, 532 U.S. at 461 (quoting Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354). In other words, 
retroactive application to the disputing parties before the court is the general rule, with Bouie 
and Rogers ensuring due process by permitting appellate judges to intervene in egregious, 
extreme cases to prevent arbitrary rulings by lower courts that are unexpected and 
indefensible. 
In this instant case, the Utah Court of Appeals did not violate due process by creating 
new law that was both unexpected and indefensible in light of prior precedent. To the 
contrary, the court of appeals reasonably and predictably interpreted legislation and applied 
it to the controversy before it.9 
9
 This Court should not conduct an independent state due process analysis because 
Petitioners offer no independent state due process analysis. This court has previously held 
that Utah appellate courts should not conduct an independent state constitutional analysis 
if a party fails to proffer an explanation regarding how the state analysis would differ from 
the federal due process analysis. State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, f21 n.2, 57 P.3d 1052 
(refusing to conduct an independent analysis under the Utah Constitution even though the 
federal and state analyses were not identical because the parties did not argue for a 
separate state constitutional analysis); see also State v. Bean. 869 P.2d 984,988-89 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to conduct a state constitutional analysis because a party offered 
no rationale why the state analysis should differ from the federal analysis); State v. Carter. 
8 i 2 P.2d 460, 462 n. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (u[w]here a [party] fails to support his state 
constitutional argument with analysis or authority, this court will not address it.") In the 
instant case, Petitioners have not even mentioned the possibility of an independent state 
analysis, much less offered any reasons or authority why a state due process analysis 
should differ from the federal analysis. 
II. The Utah Court of Appeals Correctly Held that Salt Lake City Ordinance 
12.80.070 was Invalid Because it Conflicted with State Statute, the Utah Traffic 
Control Act 
Hansen v. Evre reasonably construes the Traffic Control Act as it relates to bicycle 
traffic and affirms the well-accepted, long-standing rule that municipal ordinances that 
conflict with state statutes are void ab initio. As outlined in brief above, the court of appeals 
explained that a bicycle constitutes a vehicle under the Act, and that a bicycle path painted 
on an improved roadway surface is part of the roadway and subject to the limitations of the 
Act. Hansen, 2003 UT App 274 at H 10, 74 P.3d 1182. Then, the court properly held that 
under the Utah Code, specifically Sections 41-6-53 and -87, uSalt Lake City may not . . . 
allow bicycle riders to ride against the flow of traffic," and it correctly declared invalid the 
ordinance purporting to permit bicycling against traffic. IcL at f^ 10. 
Given the statutory provisions at issue, this was the correct result. Under Utah Code 
Section 41-6-1(55), a bicycle is a vehicle under the Traffic Control Act. Id at f^ 9 (quoting 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-1(55) (1998)). Additionally, Utah Code Section 41-6-1(39) specifies 
that the bicycle lane painted on the improved asphalt surface of the roadway in which Hansen 
was riding was part of the roadway for purposes of the Traffic Control Act. Id, (quoting Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-1(39) (1998)). With these definitions set forth, the Court then correctly 
interpreted Utah Code Section 41-6-87 and declared invalid the Salt Lake City Ordinance as 
in conflict. 
Section 41-6-87 proclaims the general rule that bicyclists are prohibited from riding 
against the flow of traffic. The court of appeals correctly determined that Section 41-6-87 
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sets forth a general rule of right-hand bicycle travel. Subsection 41-6-87(1) directs that a 
person operating a bicycle on a roadway must ride as near as practicable to the right hand 
edge unless one of three exceptions exists. Under these exceptions, a bicyclist may move 
away from the right-hand edge when (a) overtaking another bicycle, (b) preparing to make 
a left-hand turn at an intersection, or (c) if it is reasonably necessary to avoid dangerous 
conditions or obstacles. Hansen, 2003 UT App 274 at f^ 11, 74 P.3d 1182. None of these 
exceptions is applicable to the instant case, however. Therefore, subsection (1) required 
Hansen to ride as close to the right-hand edge of the roadway as possible. Said otherwise, the 
statute prohibited Hansen from riding "against the flow of traffic." Id. at ^ 10. This is the 
proper conclusion, especially when considered in light of Section 41-6-53. Section 41-6-53 
directs that "on roadways of sufficient width a vehicle [such as a bicycle as defined] shall be 
operated upon the right half of the roadway." Id at^j 11 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-53) 
(1998 Replacement)). 
Contrary to Petitioners' assertions, Section 41-6-87(3) is not an exception to the right-
hand rule, nor is the Salt Lake City Ordinance an exception. Petitioner argues that subsection 
(3) is an exception to the right-hand rule of subsection(l). (See Br. of Petitioners at 12.26-
28.) This is not the case. The exceptions to the general right-hand rule of subsection (1) are 
found in subsections (l)(a), (l)(b), and (l)(c). See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87(1) (1998 
Replacement). The court of appeals correctly explained that subsection (3) sets forth a 
different rule, one that applies when a bicycle path exists adjacent to and separate from the 
improved roadway. Subsection (3) directs bicyclists to use a bicycle path and not the 
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roadway, uw[i]f a usable path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to a roadway/' Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-87(3) (1998 Replacement). Hansen v. Evre correctly determined that 
subsection (3) did not apply because the bicycle path Hansen was riding in was "part of the 
roadway and not adjacent to it." Hansen, 2003 UT App 274 at ^ 11, 74 P.3d 1182. "Only 
when the [bicycle] path is adjacent to (i.e., separate from) the roadway is a rider required to 
use the path instead of the right hand edge of the roadway." IcL at f 12. Thus, because 
Hansen was riding in a bicycle lane that was painted on the blacktopped, improved portion 
of a road, and not in a bicycle path separate or apart from this improved portion of the 
roadway, he was required to ride on the right-hand side of the road and was prohibited from 
riding against the flow of traffic.10 
Additionally, the ordinance cannot constitute an exception to the statutory rule. It is 
well-accepted that where a municipal ordinance is in conflict with a state statute, the 
ordinance is invalid from its inception. First, the Traffic Control Act mandates that "[a] local 
authority may not enact or enforce any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions of [the 
Traffic Control Act]." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16 (1998 Replacement). Second, the court of 
appeals' decision that the Salt Lake City Ordinance is invalid as in conflict with the Traffic 
10
 Petitioners present as part of their argument, nearly verbatim, the dissenting 
opinion of Judge Jackson in Hansen v. Evre. (See Br. of Petitioners at 27-30.) The 
dissent is based, however, on the premise that where a bicycle path is painted on the 
improved roadway, the path is not actually part of the roadway but adjacent to it. Hansen, 
2003 UT App 274 at fflf 18-20, 74 P.3d 1182. This is contrary to the definition of roadway 
in Utah Code Section 41-6-1(39). The correct interpretation is that of the majority opinion 
as set forth above. 
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Control Act is in harmony with prior case law. See, e.g., Salt Lake Citv v. Kusse. 97 Utah 
113, 117-19, 93 P.2d 671, 673 (1938) (citing other jurisdictions and setting forth test for 
determining whether an ordinance conflicts with state statute); see also Redwood Gvm v. Salt 
Lake County Comm'n, 624 P.2d 1138, 1144 (Utah 1981) (stating that municipalities may 
legislate by ordinance, "provided the ordinance in no way conflicts with existing state law"); 
Walker v. Union Pac. RR. Co.. 844 P.2d 335, 339-40 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (stating that local 
governments may legislate by ordinance provided "the ordinance in no way conflicts with 
existing state law," and holding ordinance invalid as preempted by state law because it 
purports to prohibit what state statute permits); Hornsbv v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-dav Saints, 758 P.2d 929, 934 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(affirming refusal to give jury instructions because requested instruction on negligence per 
se would have been based on ordinance that was void as in conflict with Utah Code Section 
41-6-16); State v. Lineman. 97 Utah 180, 186-88, 91 P.2d 457, 460-61 (1939) (holding 
ordinance invalid as contrary to state law and therefore negligence instruction based upon 
invalid ordinance was improper). 
Petitioners argue that the power given to municipalities to adopt ordinances under 
Section 41-6-17 "is subject only to the reasonable exercise of the police power." (See Br. of 
Petitioners at 11 & 23-30.) Petitioners assert that "[t]he only limitation [the Utah] Legislature 
has placed on the right of cities to regulate the operation of bicycles on city streets is that a 
city reasonably exercise the police power." (Br. ofPetitionersat25.) Nowhere in Petitioners' 
brief, however, is any reference to Utah Code Section 41-6-16. This section of the Traffic 
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Control Act unambiguously declares that u[a] local authority may not enact or enforce any 
rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions of this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16 
(1998 Replacement Vol.) Because of this statutory prohibition that a municipality may not 
enact an ordinance that conflicts with the Traffic Control Act, the Salt Lake City ordinance 
was invalid from its inception. 
Petitioners argue "[t]he Trial Court determined the Respondents had failed to present 
any evidence which could serve as a basis to invalidate Ordinance 12.80.070, and failed to 
show that the Ordinance was not a proper exercise of the police power granted under Utah 
Code Ann. Section 41-6-17(l)(h)." (Br. of Petitioners at 25.) First, the issue of police power 
is not properly before this Court because this issue was not raised in the petition for certiorari. 
See, e.g. Coulter & Smith, Ltd.. 966 P.2d at 856; DeBry, 889 P.2d at 443. Second, Petitioners 
misstate the trial court's holding. The trial court actually explained that its decision was 
purely one of statutory construction, and that it did not pass judgment on whether Salt Lake 
City properly exercised its police powers. The trial court stated, 'The court is not ruling on 
that aspect [the issue of police powers] The SLC ordinance thus appears to not be within 
reasonable police powers to attempt to allow such dangerous conduct. Those comments, 
however, are not governing in this case." (Minute Entry Order, R. 164, Addendum C 
(emphasis added).) Instead of passing judgment on whether or not Salt Lake City properly 
exercised its police powers, the trial court construed the state legislation, holding that "it is 
directly against the Utah statute to travel by bicycle against the flow of vehicle traffic/' 
(Minute Entry Order, R. 164, Addendum C.) 
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Nature Conservancy and Amanda Eyre should not be liable because Salt Lake City 
passed an invalid ordinance. If invalid ordinances were deemed valid and binding until set 
aside by legal proceedings, municipalities could routinely pass ordinances in conflict with 
state statute, and then parties, including municipalities, could act contrary to law under the 
purported authority of the invalid ordinance until the ordinance is challenged and declared 
invalid by the courts. Such a result is contrary to established law and not in harmony with our 
judicial system.11 
III. The District Court's Decision was Properly Before the Court of Appeals 
Petitioners claim the matter was not properly before the court of appeals because Salt 
Lake City was not made a party in the district court. (Br. of Petitioners at 34.) Petitioners 
never argued to the district court that Salt Lake City should have been added as a party. 
Moreover. Petitioners never even argued to the court of appeals that Salt Lake City should 
have been a party. Because this issue was never presented to the district court or the court of 
appeals, neither court opined on it. This issue was raised for the first time in the Petition for 
Certiorari to this Court. As a result, there is no decision by the court of appeals on this issue 
that can be reviewed on certiorari. Because this Court did not specify on which issues it 
granted certiorari, however, Respondents address this issue. 
1
' Finally, it is noteworthy that after Salt Lake City understood that Ordinance 
12.80.070 was invalid, it amended the ordinance to comport with Section 41-6-87. (See 
Ordinance Amending Section 12.80.070, Addendum F.) Amended Ordinance 12.80.070, 
Subsection B adopted the language from Utah Code Section 41-6-87. Then, so as to 
eliminate any possible confusion, Subsection C clarifies that a bicyclist may not travel 
against traffic, even in a bicycle lane like the one in question. 
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A. The District Court's Decision was Properly Before the Court of Appeals 
Because this Court Granted Petitioners' Interlocutory Appeal and 
Transferred the Case to the Court of Appeals 
Petitioners' final point is that the validity of the Salt Lake City Ordinance was not 
properly before the court of appeals for decision. This argument is disingenuous. It was 
Petitioners themselves who requested that the issue be decided on an interlocutory appeal. 
Petitioners asked for appellate review of the district court's decision. Petitioners cannot now 
claim that the decision was not properly before the appellate court. Such invited error must 
be rejected. See, .e.g.. Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, 1f 20, 993 P.2d 191; Miller v. 
Martmeau & Co.. Certified Pub. Accountants, 1999 UT App 216, U 42, 983 P.2d 1107 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
Moreover, the case was before the court of appeals pursuant to this Court's Order. 
(Order Granting Certiorari, Addendum B.) The district court denied Petitioners' motion for 
summary judgment and concluded that jury instructions would be tailored reflecting the state 
statute—Hansen did not have the right to bicycle against the flow of traffic, and the ordinance 
was invalid because it conflicted with the statute. Petitioners requested that this decision be 
reviewed on appeal. This Court granted Petitioners' request for an interlocutory appeal and 
instructed the court of appeals to review the decision. Petitioners cannot legitimately claim 
that the matter was not properly before the court of appeals. 
B. The District Court Invalidated the Ordinance 
Petitioners claim the district court order was not properly before the court of appeals 
because the district court allegedly "refused to invalidate the ordinance." (Br. of Petitioners' 
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at 17; Pet. for Cert, at 16-17.) This misconstrues the district court's decision. The trial court 
held that the ordinance was invalid when he denied Hansen's motion for summary judgment. 
The trial court's decision reads, in relevant part: 
The court finds that state law was and is (and probably always has been) 
clear that bicycles are to ride in the direction of motor vehicle traffic. . . . The 
court reads [the law] to mean that bicycles are still to ride with traffic, and if 
there is a bicycle lane, the bicycles should use the lane rather than the roadway. 
Subsection (3) of 41-6-87 does not give license to travel against traffic even in 
a bicycle lane. 
An ordinance that purports to allow otherwise is in conflict with such 
state law. 
. . . [I]t is directly against the Utah statute to travel by bicycle against the 
flow of vehicle traffic. 
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that plaintiff 
was not justified by ordinance nor state law in traveling in the direction he was 
against traffic. 
(Minute Entry Order, R. 164, Addendum C.) In denying summary judgment, the district 
court held the ordinance was invalid. Hansen asked for a ruling that the ordinance permitted 
him to ride against traffic in the bicycle lane. This was denied. The district court specifically 
held that state legislation prohibited bicycling against the flow of traffic. The district court 
also expressly stated that any ordinance that purports to allow otherwise conflicts with state 
law. In denying the Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment the court necessarily 
held that because the ordinance conflicts with state legislation, the ordinance was invalid. 
C. Salt Lake City was not a Necessary Party Where the Ordinance was 
Attacked Collaterally 
Petitioners also contend that the court of appeals should not have determined the Salt 
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Lake City Ordinance was invalid because Salt Lake City should have been made a party under 
Utah Code Section 78-33-11 of the Utah Declaratory Judgments Act. (See Br. of Petitioners 
at 34; Pet. for Cert, at 15-17.) 
The instant action was never a declaratory judgment action. As a result, Section 78-
33-11 of the Utah Declaratory Judgments Act is inapplicable. Section 78-33-11 requires a 
municipality to be named a party if a declaratory judgment action is brought to declare a 
municipal ordinance invalid. Because the instant action was not a declaratory judgment 
action, it was not necessary that the municipality be made a party. 
Moreover, even if the instant action had been a declaratory judgment action, just 
because the municipal entity was not a party did not deprive the court of appeals of 
jurisdiction and prevent it from deciding the issue. See Hemenwav & Moser Co. v. Funk, 100 
Utah 72, 77. 106 P.2d 779, 781 (1940) (noting prior version of section 78-33-11 required 
attorney general to be served in declaratory judgment action challenging constitutionality of 
Liquor Control Act, but proceeding to address the issue of the statute's constitutionality). 
Additionally, the Salt Lake City ordinance was subject to collateral attack in this case 
without Salt Lake City as a party because the ordinance was void ab initio. Hansen invoked 
the authority of the void ordinance by requesting a jury instruction based upon it. If an 
ordinance is void, it may always be collaterally attacked, and a void ordinance is subject to 
direct or collateral attack whenever its authority is invoked in a judicial proceeding. See, e.g.. 
Willow Park v. Bryant. 763 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) ("The law is well settled 
that a collateral attack is proper where... the ordinances are void.") (citations omitted); Dep't 
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of Public Works & Bldgs. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank. 334N.E.2d810, 818 (111. Ct. A pp. 1975). 
Willow Park provides guidance here. In Willow Park, the plaintiff alleged that the matter was 
not properly before the court because the attorney general was not made a party to the lawsuit 
as required by statute. 763 S.W.2d at 508. A Texas statute provided that in any proceeding 
involving the validity of a municipal ordinance, the municipality must be made a party and 
the attorney general must also be served with a copy of the proceeding and is entitled to be 
heard. Id The attorney general was never served or given an opportunity to be heard. Id 
Nevertheless, the court held that the collateral attack was still proper because the ordinance 
was void ab initio. Id at 508-09. Similarly, in the instant case, even though the declaratory 
judgment statute states requires that a municipality be made a party in a direct attack or 
declaratory judgment action, Salt Lake City was not a necessary party because the city 
ordinance was void ab initio and subject to collateral attack. 
This is not the first time that an ordinance has been declared invalid in Utah without 
including the governmental entity that promulgated the ordinance as a party. Utah courts 
have, on numerous occasions, determined that ordinances are invalid without including the 
municipality as a party. See, e.g.. Walker, 844 P.2d at 339-40; Hornsbv, 758 P.2d at 934-35; 
Lingman, 97 Utah at 186-88, 91 P.2d at 460-61. In Walker, like the instant case, the district 
court refused to give jury instructions based upon a Salt Lake City Ordinance, holding that 
the ordinance was invalid because it conflicted with state statute. 844 P.2d at 339-40. The 
decision was affirmed on appeal despite the fact that Salt Lake City was not a party. Id In 
Hornsbv, also like the instant case, the district court refused to give jury instructions because 
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the requested instruction would have been based on a Salt Lake County ordinance that was 
void as in conflict with state statute. 758 P.2d at 934-35. The decision was affirmed despite 
the fact that Salt Lake County was not a party. IcL In Lingman, the district court refused to 
give an instruction because the requested instruction was based upon a Salt Lake City 
ordinance that was invalid. 97 Utah at 186-188, 460-61. The decision was affirmed even 
though Salt Lake County was not a party. IcL The instant case is just like these three cases. 
The district court determined that the Salt Lake City ordinance was invalid and refused to give 
jury instructions based on the ordinance. (See Minute Entry of the District Court, R. 164, 
Addendum C.) The Utah Court of Appeals, while not presented with this issue, nevertheless 
affirmed. 
IV. Other Issues Alleged by Petitioners Are Not Properly Before This Court 
Finally, Petitioner alleges several errors by the district court. Nature Conservancy 
reiterates that these issues are not properly before this Court because they were not raised in 
the Petition for Certiorari. See, e.g. Coulter & Smith, Ltd.. 966 P.2d 852, 856 (citing, inter 
alia, DeBrv v.Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995), and Butterfield v. Okubo. 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 
1992), for the proposition that review on certiorari is limited to examining the court of 
appeals' decision, and issues not raised in the petition for certiorari are not properly before 
the Court). 
CONCLUSION 
First, Hansen was not deprived of due process. The Salt Lake City ordinance was void 
from its inception because it conflicted with state statutory law. Additionally, Hansen 
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received due process because, under Bouie and Rogers, the court of appeals' decision was not 
so unexpected or indefensible that it deprived Petitioner of fair warning. To the contrary, 
given the statutory provisions at issue, the opinion was reasonable and predicable. Second, 
the Utah Court of Appeals correctly construed the Utah Traffic Control Act and correctly 
invalidated the Salt Lake City ordinance as in conflict with the Act. Third, the trial court's 
decision invalidating the ordinance was properly before the court of appeals for decision. 
Petitioners invited the error they allege, the matter was before the court of appeals pursuant 
to this Court's order, the district court properly invalidated the city ordinance, and Salt Lake 
City did not need to be a party for the court to invalidate the ordinance. 
The decision of the court of appeals should be affirmed. 
lis # 0 DATED this W day of r\psU^ 2004. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Robert L. Janicki 
Michael K. Wooiley 
Attorneys for Respondent The NatuY^Conservancy 
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Addendum A 
Court of Appeals' Decision 
Hansen v. Eyre. 2003 UT App 274, 74 P.3d 1182 
This opinion is subject to revisioa before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT Or APPEALS 
ocOoo 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JUL 2 5 2003 
Paulette Stagg 
Cterk of the Court 
T y l e r Hansen and W o r k e r s ' 
C o m p e n s a t i o n Fund c f U t a h , 
• P l a i n t i f f s and A p p e l l a n t s , 
v . 
Amanda S. Eyre and The Nature 
Conservancy, 
Defendants and Aooellees. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 2002049S-CA 
F I L E D 
( J u l y 2 5 , 2003) 
i2003 UT Aoc 2 74 
Third District:, Murray Department 
The Honorable Bruce Lubeck 
Attorneys: Edward T. Wells and Mel S. Martin, Mur-v -c-
Appellant ~~-' ~ ~ 
Lloyd R. Jones, Robert L. Janicki, and Mi-- = -I ~< 
Woolley, Salt Lake City, for Appellees 
Berore Judges Jackson, Greenwood, and Thome. 
THORNS, Judge: 
Hi Appellants Tyler Hansen and the Workers' Comoe-«Mcn F^d 
appeal tnetnal court's denial of their motion for'D^t?^ 
summary judgment. We affirm. ^-- — 
BACKGROUND 
<f2 Cn February 17, 2000, Hansen was riding his bicycle 
eastbcund, on the left hand side of the street and against t 
flow of traffic, but w^r^~ t-h<=. r-^ -^-r^ ~ -- - -~- • atnsi 
pa tn . ~s r.e approached the incerseccior . of 200 Scu^- = ~-
 C Q o 
a S S
= - Ama^sa- Syre was wa i t ing in her car fa r tb* f i ^ '"" 
wescoound t r a f f i c t o subside so that she could " t u - - : ° ^ , „ . . 
._ne wes-oounc lane cf 200 South. When Evre was s a t ' ^ T ^ Z ^ 
r-s rlow of t r a f f i c was s u f f i c i e n t l y l i c h t to I l low W ^ o 
uccsss ru lxy make h e r r i g h t t u rn , she acce le ra ted a - c u ^ d I s -
o m e r . However, before Eyre could corrolp*-* h«- t u ^ J - - t~* 
lansen co l l i ded , i n j u r i n g Hansen. When' ^ a c c i d e n t c ^ u r r e l ? 
both Hansen and Eyre were operating within the scoce of their 
employment. 
fa Following the accident, Hansen, along with the Workers' 
Compensation Fund, filed suit. In essence, Hansen claimed t'^ at 
Eyre had violated various sections of the Utah Code, ard~at i""st 
one provision of the Salt Lake City ordinances, thereby causinc 
the accident.^ Hansen filed a motion for partial summary "" 
judgment, asking the trial court to rule that Hansen "had a lecal 
right to ride a bicycle in an eastbound direction in the" 
designated bicycle lane on the north side of 200 South Street in 
Salt Lake City." Hansen based his motion on Salt Lak=> Otv "ut" 
Ordinance 12.80.070 (Supp. 1993) which reads, in relevant part: " 
"It is^unlawful for operators of bicycles: . . . [t]o ride upon 
the
, -sft-hand side of any street, except when they are within a 
marked bicycle lane or when riding upon a one-wav street." 
%A Eyre opposed Hansen's motion, arguing that the Salt Lake 
City Ordinance conflicted with state law and, therefore" Farse-* 
could not havei a right to ride against the flow of "traffic aVa 
matter^or lav/.- Che trial court entertained oral argument 'and 
then, in a written decision, denied Hansen's motion." ""-""its" 
decision, the trial court determined that the ordir.a-c*"'-eli=-
upon by Hansen cperated outside Salt Lake City's reaso^ =bi<=-
police powers- because "state law was and is' (and crohablv "aiwavs 
has been) clear that bicvcles are to ride in the <£•>•-*,--,-on of " 
motor vehicle traffic. . . . An ordinance that curoorcs" to allow 
otnerwise is m cor.riict with state law." The tria^ cou~t 
however, decided to leave to the trier of fact tnVimoact'o" its 
decision en the issue of negligence. Hansen subsecuer.tiv 
petitioned the supreme court for interlocutor/ review"." ~^he cou-t 
granted Hansen's petition and transferred the*case'to'tn"s" court, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 73-2-2 (A) qe~ ut = h Cod« 
Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (2002). We affirm. — a 
1. Eyre a_so filed a cross-motion for summarv -udcrr^ --
 Cr t'- = 
same suoject, which the trial court later denied, "-cwev^r -"-<=• 
disposition of gyre's motion is not at issue in this^aopeal 
2. Utah's Traffic Code expressly denies to local authorities tb* 
power to create rules or ordinances that conflict w" t* »xistinc 
state law. S_*e Utah Code Ann. § 45-6-16 (1998) ("A~locai 
authority may not enact or enforce any rule or ordinance"-<*n 
conflict with the provisions of this chanter."). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD C? REVIEW 
15 Hansen argues that the trial court erred in its statutcrv 
interpretaticr. and, as a result, erred in denying his metier. fo~ 
summary judgment. Issues cf statutory interpretation oresen1-
cuestions of lav/ that we review for correctness. s « Tpopo""-
Weber Ccuntv, 2002 UT 103,114, 57 P. 3d 1073. We revliw the" 
granting or denial cf a summary judgment motion for correct-ess 
with no deference given to the trial court's decision.3 ~S~ee~~id.' 
ANALYSIS 
f6 Hansen asserts that Dursuant to Salt Lake City Ut 
Ordinance 12.80.C7C(1) (SUDO. 1993) he had an absolute -ic^- to 
travel against the flow of traffic while in a desicnated b"-vcl» 
iane. Tr.eretcre, he argues, the trial court erred T^  denyiVc'^'s 
mcticn tor partial summary judgment. Eyre, in ccr.tras- 'arc—l 
that section 12.80.070(1) conflicts with existinc scat* ^ =v"a-^ 
is thus invalid. Because these statutory arguments are 
mtertwir.ee, we actress them in concert. 
<]7 Well-settled rules of statute-/ interpretation inS-r.-- u* 
that 
[wjhen interpreting a statute, this court 
locks first to the statute's plain lancuarre 
to determine the Legislature's intent and" 
purpose. We read the plain language of the 
statute as a whole, and interpret its 
provisions in harmony with ether statutes in 
the same chapter and related chaoters. We 
follow the "cardinal rule that the eeneral 
purpose, intent and punoort of the whole act 
snail control, and that all the parts be 
interpreted as subsidiarv and harmonious rQ 
its manifest object." 
Miller v. W eavsr, 2003 UT 12,^17, 66 ?.3d 592 (citations 
Moreover, 
Is] tatutes are considered to be m pari 
must be construed tcgetner 
when they relate to the same person or tnmg, 
to the same class of persons or things, or 
3 m e parties agree that there is no dispute as to th» rrac-^al 
tacts or tms_case. Thus, we focus our examination
 c ' t C 
correctness or the trial court's legal conclusions." " 
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have the same purpose or object. If it is 
natural or reasonable to think that the 
understanding of the legislacure or of 
persons affected by the statute would be 
influenced by another statute, then those 
statuses should be construed to be in pari 
materia, construed with reference co cne 
another and harmonized if possible. 
TTrah Countv v. Orem Citv, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1935) 
(footnotes omitted). 
*[3 In this case, the statutory ace in question is Utah's 
Traffic Rules and Regulations (Traffic Control Act:) . See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 41-6-1 to -135 (1993 & Supp. 2002) . Within the 
Traffic Control Act, Article II contains the majority of the 
statutes applicable to the use and operation of bicycles. See 
id. § 41-6-83 to -SO.5. However, section 41-6-84 expands the 
scene of applicable regulations beyond Article 11, staring: 
Except as . . . specified under this article, 
a person operating a bicycle or any vehicle 
or device propelled by human power or a moped 
has all the rights and is subiect to the 
previsions of this chanter applicable to the 
operator of anv ether vehicle. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
<[9 Thus, we must begin our analysis with an examination of 
certain terms material to the instant case. First, Utah Code 
Annotated section 41-6-1(55) defines "vehicle" as "every device 
in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be 
transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices used 
exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks." Id. § 41-5-1(55) 
(1993). Clearly then, for purposes of the Traffic Control Act, a 
bicvele is a vehicle. Section 41-5-1 also defines the term 
"roadway." See id. § 41-6-1(39). A roadway, for purposes of the 
Traffic Control Act, is "that portion of highway improved, 
designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of 
the sidewalk, berm, or shoulder, even though any of them are used 
bv oersozis riding bicycles or other human-powered vehicles." Id. 
Thus, the areas of highway not considered part of the roadway 
include, exclusively, "bermis]," "shoulder[s] ," and 
"sidewalk[s]." Id. Accordingly, by both implication and plain 
language, bicycle paths located on "that portion of highway 
improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel" are 
part of the roadway and subject to the limitations of the Traffic 
Control Ace. Id. 
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*!lO Tr.e import of these terms to the instant case becomes clear 
when we examine Utah Code Annotated section 41-6-53, which stat=~ 
that "[oln all roadways of sufficient widen, a vehicle sbail be 
operated upon the right half of the roadway."4 id. § "41-5.53 
(1993) . applying the definitions provided within t"^ "^a'^'c 
Control Ac:t to section 41-6-53, " [o]n ail roldways of sufflci<=n-
width [whether or not traveling in a desicnated bicvcl<= oa-h] a 
[bicycle] shall be operated upon the right half of the"roadwav * 
Ic_ Therefore, absent a clear exception to this ru1 e w^nir tb« 
Tratric Control Act, Sale Lake City may not, in the exe-ciV o = ~ 
its police power, allow bicycle riders to ride aaainstfth* How 
of traffic. 
til Hansen argues that such an exceotion exists -< r Ut=h Cod^ 
Annotated section 41-6-37 (1993). Section 41-5-37," in~"rei»va^ i-
part, ^ sets torth: "A person operating a bicycle or a mooed uoor 
a roaoway at _less cnan the normal speed of traffic at the tirr^  
and plate and under the conditions then existinc shall >-~'de as 
near as practicable to the right-hand edce of the >-o = ^-v=v I-<-"=" -
when' the rider is "overtaking and passinc another~v=-~ic"l^~' "~~ 
proceeding m the same direction" of travel, "oreoarinc to mak- a 
lett turn," or as "reasonably necessary" to avoid" cbst = cl = <= """Td" 
§ 41-6-= 7(1) (a)-(c) . Section 41-6-37 further states: ""Z^~a ~ — 
:sa
--
5
 patn tor bicycles nas been trovided adi=^ =-'- --*
 a ~-»-~-.--v 
?-:YZZe„Z-r77-3, £ h a 1 1 u s e t«e Path and not the roadwav." T^"^' ' 
5 -=_-o-=/(^)^ ^empnasis acdeo) . We do not interpret this Ta-cu=~-
to provide the exception urasd by Hansen. " " =•—s1--^ -
112 The term ;'ad;acent" is defined to mean "not dista— » 
"nearer, " or "having the vertex and one side in ccm~/~~""' M-r-->*-
tvecster's Collegiate Dictionary 14 (10th ed. 1999). fn
 U S £~ " "" 
adjacent "u.ay or may not imply contact but always imollis ab=—-» 
°
r47(;r-r;-:-? ;f *<!-* s a- s k^-d i n between." Id,. Thus", "iection^I-
c-o7(3) has application omy m circumstances where a b^vci-
patn lies not upon or within the borders of a roadwav "b'"t -
ins_eac when the path lies off of, and next to, the ^oa-wav 
Only wnen tr.e patn is adjacent to (i.e., seoarate -"rcra) V - ' 
roadway is a rider required to use the path" inste=^"0- rT~T~^-
ecge 01 one roadway. ~ ~ "~ --=---
cz tne rtacway and not adjacent to it. Moreover, even I* r-J 
_acts c__tms case suggested that section 41-5-37(3) w=s~ 
app_icao_e, utter our general rules of statutorv cc—r-c-ic-
4. Utan Czza Annotated section 41-6-53 articulates f — 
exceptions to this -ale, none of which involve b^vc^s" <=— 
Utan Coce Ann. § 41-5-53(1) (a) -(d) (1993). °~/<=~*. S _ 
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"the provision more specific in application governs over the more 
general provision." Hall v. Department of Corr., 2001 UT 34,^15, 
24 P. 3d S53. Here, the Traffic Control Act specifically directs 
chat n[o]n all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be 
operated upon the right half of the roadway." Utah Code Ann. 
§"41-6-53. In contrast, section 41-6-87(3) is silent concerning 
the direction of travel required or allowed. See id. § 41-6-
87(3). Accordingly, the specific language of section 41-6-53 
governs the direction of travel that vehicles, including 
bicycles, must follov/ when on a roadway. Thus, bicycles, like 
cars, must "operate [] on the right half of the roadway," and must 
conform with the flow of traffic applicable to all vehicles. Id. 
§ 41-6-53. 
^14 Finally, while not controlling in this case, effective April 
30, 2001, the Legislature amended section 41-5-37 to include the 
following language: "A person operating a bicycle or moped on a 
highway shall operate in the designated direction of traffic." 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-37(2) (Supp. 2002). This language 
reinforces the notion that the Legislature never intended to 
permit bicycle traffic to flow against the direction of traffic, 
recardless of the existence of bicvcle paths.5 
CONCLUSION 
<[i5 We affirm the trial court's decision denying Hansen's motion 
for partial summary judgment. Moreover, we conclude that to the 
extent that subsection one of Salt Lake City, Ut. , Ordinance 
5. Hansen presented two additional issues on appeal, both.of 
which essentially take the form of requesting from this court a 
ruling that would foreclose the issue of comparative negligence 
on remand. However, neither issue comports with the recuiremencs 
of rule 24 of the Utah Rules cf Aooellate Procedure. See Smith 
v. Smith, 1S53 UT App 370,^3, S35~?.2d 14 ("An issue is 
inadequately briefed when the overall analvsis of the issue is so 
13,ckino as to shift t^e burden of resee^ c'"7 a"^ ^ cr-^ nIT-HOT?r ro r*^.^  
reviewing court." (quotations and citation omitted}). Thus, we 
do not address either point. Moreover, from our reading of the 
record, the trial court has yet to issue any definitive ruling on 
these issues, thus, without a final order concerning these 
matters, we are without jurisdiction to address them. See State 
v. Morris, 2002 UT App 305,^7, 57 P. 3d 233 (" [W] ithout a final 
order en the record, [this] court has no jurisdiction to hear an 
aooeal.") . 
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12.3C.070 cermics che riding of a bicycle againsc the flow of 
traffic, ic is invalid. 
w-sf- ^ 
W11 i i afn A. T h o m e J r . , / o udge 
<l!5 I CONCUR 
^ ; ^ -^ * = — . ^ r 
Pamela T. Greenwood, u jcge 
JACKS DM, Presiding wUdge (dissenting) : 
117 resceccfuilv dissenc from mv ccileacues' decision. 
Alchough che major icy opinion makes a persuasive case for 
affirming cne trial courc's decision, 1 believe thai no cc 
:an Coce Ann. s -=1-6 -87(1) (1993) a a.5 L . ^ maiontv nas con 
r.s crue 
,e ucses 
several problems. These problems arise as che resulc of 
scacucory scheme chac is hardly a model of clarity and 
consistency. 
When conscruing a statute, we look firsc co 
the plain meaning of the words used and their 
scatucory concexc. The plain language rule 
also requires thac we give effect co all che 
terms of a stacuce so that no one provision 
is construed in isolation. Furthermore, l1fif 
doubt or uncertainty exiscs as to the meaning 
or application of an ace's provisions, the 
Courc should analvce the act m its entirecv 
and harmonize its provisions in accordance 
wioh che leoislacive mcent and ourcose. r ' 
r^ 1— r> r^i _ (-• i ' " ~ 943 
?.2d 542, 545 (Ucan 1937)
 vcicacicns cmiccec) . ^ -. ^ \\ , 
""i r ~i P> " ***" c ^ a v q f - r»« ewe scacuccrv crcvisions coinz — ice __-. L.*i*r__j. Uwwrsncr — £ 
provision more specific in applicacion governs over the more 
general provision. " Hall v. Decarcmenc of C rr^. 2001 UT 34, *IiO, 
24 ?.3d 953 . 
*[1S When reading the scacute as a whole, I would conclude the 
trial courc erred by ruling that seccion 41-S-37 prohibits che 
20020493-CA. 
u^- of a left-hand bicycle each. It is true that section 41-5-
37(1) sets forth a general rule requiring bicyclists to ,!ride as 
-ear as oraccicable"to the right-hand edge of the roadway." Ucai" 
Cede Ann" § 41-6-37(1). However, it seems clear to me than 
subsection"(1) does not apply in cases where a roadway has an 
adjacent bicvele oath, since it never mentions bicycle paths and 
since subsection. (3) does. 
<[l9 Subsection (3) requires the use of a bicycle path when one 
extsts. See Utah Code^Ann. § 41-5-37(3). Thus, while subsectio: 
Vl) certainly sets forth a rule 'of general application, it does 
not covern the specific situation where a bicycle path exists. 
Thus7 "the provision more specific in application [subsection 
(3)]'aoverns over the more general provision [subsection (1)]." 
L11,W20Q1 UT 34 at ^10. 
n zz±--_, 
a. w *J2Q To conclude otherwise, as the majority does, would pose 
least three serious problems that would prevent us from 
harmonizing all portions of the statute. First, if we concluded 
that subsection (1) requires bicyclists to stay to the right side 
of the roadway even when a left-hand bicycle path exists, we 
would necessarily create an exception to subsection (3) that the 
legislature did not include. Specifically, subsection (3) 
provides that 1! [i] f a usable path for bicycles has been provided 
adjacent to a roadway, bicycle riders shall use the path and not 
the roadway." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87(3). It does not say 
"bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway, unless 
the oath is ch the left-hand side of the roadway." Subsection 
(3) requires the use of an existing bicycle path without 
limitation as to which direction the bicyclist must ride, and 
does not limit bicyclists to one side of the road. 
^21 Second, to construe section 41-6-37 as the majority does 
renders subsection (3) inoperable. If we concluded that 
subsection (1) required bicyclists to ride on the right side of 
the road and precluded them from riding in a left-hand bicycle 
oath, then subsection (3) would be inoperable whether there is a 
bicvele path on either side or both sides. See Utah Code Ann. 
5 41-5-37(1) (requiring bicyclist to stay to the far right of the 
"roadway'1); Utah Code Ann. § 41-5-1(39) (defining "roadway" as 
"that portion of highway . . . ordinarily used for vehicular 
travel") . The bicyclist wcuid then be required to ignore the 
stecific mandate to ride in the designated bicycle path, whether 
adjacent to the right or the left of the roadway, and follow the 
more general rule by staying as far to the right of the roadway 
as possible. 
^22 Third, such a construction would render subsections (1) and 
(3) contradictory, thus subverting the rule that we must 
,f (
 "harmonize its provisions . " f ,f Kimball, 943 P.2d at 643 
exists, she would violate Vn-'ma-d-"- :t = nc;na:id bicycle each 
- . - ^ designated bieve^ pa"^ c^% SUDSS^ion (3} to ride 
rclowed the mandate of 'subs--,-
 0 ? f 3?\ O C : l e; > R d ' " she 
designated b^v^T* -a-C i ar s — -lc,n (3) oy riding in tn« 
the roaawav. - n — co S-*Y to tne far ^ icbt 
or 
<f23 In order to harmonize 
section 41-S.87; r ; ;uid1oSru?:v :bf : f ;" c o » " potion, of 
a general rule that does nSc cor"^c 'u^ f f = - 0 n ( " S S C s f ° « h destcr.atec fcievcie ca;h = T-,=°--J p • roaaway with 
requires the uie of" IbTcvc^ n " ? ' f^"ccion "> applies and 
- f r y v ^ t o ~ pgi^SrS^I fif;f:hJf-«_ 
readies; cS rt!CfcVr[^ p H h ^ f L ^ f ' ^ ^ ^ 
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n. uacKson 
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Addendum B 
Order Granting Certiorari 
DK ~ 4 20Q JO 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE 07 UTAH 
00O00 
Tyler Hansen and The Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah, 
Petitioners, 
v. No. 20030731-SC 
20020498-CA 
Amanda S. Eyre and The Nature 0102Q3125 
Conservancy, 
Respondents. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the courc upon a Pet.1r.10n for Writ cf 
Certiorari, filed pursuant to Rule 45, of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, 
IT TS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
Granted. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Date / " C h r i s t i n e M. Durham 
Chief J u s t i c e 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that an December 3, 2003, a true and correct 
copy of^the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United si-^t-.e: 
mail" to the parties listed' below; 
EDWARD'T: WELLS-
MEL S. MARTIN 
MEL S MARTIN PC 
5232 S COMMERCE DR 
#D-292 
MURRAY UT 84107 
ROBERT L. JANICKI 
MICHAEL K. WQOLLEY 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 EXCHANGE PL STE 600 
600 BOSTON BLDG 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
LLOYD R. JONES 
PETERSEN & HANSEN 
230 S 500 E STE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102 
and a true and correct "copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand 
delivered to a personal representative of the courts listed 
below: 
THIRD DISTRICT, MURRAY DEPT 
ATTN: SOPHIE / CATHY 
4 50 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 13 60 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 34114-1860 
PAULE7TS' STAGG 
COURT OF APPEALS 
450 5 STATE ST 
PO 30X 140230 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 94114-0230 
Deputy Clerk w 
Case Nc. 20030731-SC 
THIRD DISTRICT, MURRAY DEPT, 010203125 
Addendum C 
Minute Entry of the District Court 
TN THS DISTRICT i'CQtfRT "OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND Cgn&*<siL.Tti'''ijrxz COUNTY/ MURRAY DEPARTMENT, 
ST^ .TjE OF UTAH 
TYLER PIANSEN a/id "WORKERS 
COMPENSATION ^i UN D, 
Plaintiffs, 
"3 • 
AMANDA EYRE and THE NATURE 
CONSEP-VANCY, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 010203125 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUEECK 
Court Clerk: Linda Vance 
June 5, 2002 
The above matter came before the court en June 5, 2002, on 
plaintiff's Motion for partial summary judgment and defendants' 
cross motions f°r partial summary judgment. Plaintiff was present 
with counsel Edward T. Wells, defendant Eyre was present through 
counsel Lloyd-R. Jones, and defendant Mature Conservancy was 
present through counsel Robert Janicki-
Iri this case plaintiff sought partial^ summary judgment in a 
motion filed September 26, 2001. The court granted defendant 
Eyre's Rule 56(f) motion for a continuance. Defendant Mature 
Conservancy was later added -as a defendant and on March 28, 2002, 
filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment. Defendant 
Evre joined in that motion.- plaintiff then renewed his motion 
for partial summary judgment. Each "party responded and the 
moving parties each, replied. 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
The following facts do not appear to be in dispute. 
This case involves an automobile-bicycle accident at 
approximately 200 South and 500 East in Salt Lake "City. 
plaintiff was traveling east-bound on 200 South, and at the time; 
of the accident on the north side of the street, against^ motor 
vehicle traffic, within a marked bicycle lane. The lane is 
aclacenc to vehicle travel lanes and on - the north of the bicycle 
lane there-is parking spaces for vehicles. He -was just west of 
5GQ East, intending to turn north onto 500 East when he was hit 
by the vehicle driven by defendant Eyre -as she was turning west 
onto 200 South after coming from the north, thus being south-
bound until'she began her turn and the bicycle and Eyre's vehicle 
collided. Plaintiff was injured and sues Eyre and added her 
employer Nature Conservancy. 
ANALYSIS 
The stanaards for granting summary judgment are well known 
and will not be repeated. Plaintiff asserts that as a matter of 
law tne court should grant his motion and declare that under a 
Salt Lake City Ordinance he had the right to be traveling in tne 
bicycle lane as he was and he was thus not negligent for doing 
so. Defendants assert contrariwise that the SLC Ordinance is in 
conflict with State law and thus plaintiff was indeed negligent 
for traveling as he was in the eastbound bicycle lane against 
vehicular traffic. Defendants thus claim the court should grant 
their motion and find plaintiff was negligent. 
Various statutes and ordinances come into play. At the time 
of the incident in February, 2000, Utah Cede Ann. 41-6-37 
required bicycles to travel 
(1} . . .as near as practicable to the right-hand edge 
of the roadway except when: 
(b) preparing to make a left turn at an 
intersection . . . 
(3) If a usable path for bicycles has been provided 
adjacent to the rcacway, bicycle riders shall use 
the path and not the roadway. 
U.C.A. 41-6-17(I) (h) provides that local authorities, "with 
respect to highways under their jurisdiction and within the 
reasonable exercise cf police power,7' may "regulate the operation 
of bicycles . . 
Plaintiff argues he was allowed to travel as he was by an 
ordinance, SLC Ordinance, 12.30.070(1) which provided: 
It is unlawful for operators of bicycles: 
(K) When riding upon a roadway marked 
with a bicycle lane to ride upon the 
sidewalk or any portion of the roadway 
outside the marked bicycle lane except 
when making a left turn; 
(Z) To rice upon the left-hanc side cf 
a market bicycle lane 
Plaintiff tnus argues that the court should declare that the 
ordinance allows plaintiff to ride in a marked bicycle lane, even 
if it is on the left side of the road and going against vehicle 
traffic. 
Utah law is clear that a local ordinance mav be enacted that 
covers subjects already coverec cy state legislation but only if 
scate law does nor foreclose local legislation and "the ordnance 
in to *ay conflicts with existing state law." 
The court finds that state law was and is (arid probably 
always has been) clear that bicycles are to ride in the direction 
cf motor vehicle traffic. C C A . 41-6-37(3) is not to the 
contrary. The court reads chat statute to mean that bicycles are 
still to ride with traffic, and if there is a bicycle lane, the 
bicvcles should use the lane rather than the roadway. Subsection 
(3) cf 41-6-37 does net give license to travel against traffic 
even in a bicycle lane. 
An ordinance that purports to allow otherwise is in conflict 
with such state law. Further, any ordinance which is to regulate 
bievcie traffic is to be within reasonable police powers under 
41-6-17. To allow bicycle riders to ride against traffic, even in 
a narked bicycle lane, appears to invite the very sort of 
incident that is the subject of this lawsuit. However, the court 
is without any facts (as pointed out by plaintiff) to find that 
such an ordinance is net-within the reasonable police powers. 
However, from a common sense standpoint it is well known that the 
tendency cf most motorists, any law to the contrary 
notwithstanding, when they are turning right onto a perpendicular 
street, is to lock to their left for enccming traffic, but not to 
look to their right. Thus, an ordinance that allows such biovole 
traffic as plaintiff argues may or may net be within the police 
powers of the City. The court is not ruling on that aspect as it 
is without sufficient facts. Again, however, the ordinance 
appears to create problems with bicyclists in the sane narrow 
lane going in two different directions. It invites dangers to 
motorists turning into oncoming bicycle traffic. The SIT 
ordinance thus appears to not be within reasonable police powers 
to attempt to allow such dangerous conduct. Those comments, 
however, are not governing in this case. 
However, more importantly, it is directly against the Utah 
statute to travel by bicycle against the flow of'vehicle traffic. 
Nothing in state law gives any indication that travel by bicycles 
against vehicle traffic is approved. 
judgment as a matter of lav/. The riding conduct is certainly a 
factor a trier cf fact can consider in determining negligence. 
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that 
plaintiff was not justified by ordinance nor state law in 
traveling in the direction he was against traffic. That will be 
one factor in their evaluation of negligence and comparative 
necligence. The parties can marshal whatever evidence they have 
as\oVne safety (or lack thereof) of such conduct. 
Neither party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
DATED this ""/ day cf June, 2002. 
,iS 
~--:^<l^ 
Addendum D 
Order Granting Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order 
Dated August 23, 2002 
:N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OE UTAK 
ocOoo 
No. 20Q20498-SC 
010203125 
Tvler Hansen and The Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah, 
Plaintiffs and Petitioners, 
v. 
Amanda S, Eyre and The Nature 
Conservancy, 
Defendants and Resoondents 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for 
Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order, filed pursuant to 
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Aopellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Perm: 
Aooeal an interlocutory Order filed on June 25, 2002 i: 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED pursuant no Section 78-2-2(4), Utah 
Code Annotated, this matter is transferred to the Utah Court o: 
Appeals for disposition. All further pleadings and 
correspondence should be directed to that court. 
For The Court : 
kdiM^7/ teOJ-
^W 
Addendum E 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
IN THE SUPREME COURT UTAH OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TYLER HANSEN and THE WORKERS \ 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, ; 
PETITIONERS, ] 
vs. ] 
AMANDA S. EYRE AND THE NATURE : 
CONSERVANCY, ; 
RESPONDENTS. ; 
) PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
) CERTIORARI 
) Case No. 
) Ct. App. No. 20020498CA 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Robert L. Janicki 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Appellee 
The Nature Conservancy 
9 Exchange Place #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Respondent 
The Nature Conservancy 
Lloyd R. Jones Edward T. Wells 
PETERSON & HANSEN Mel S. Martin 
Attorneys for Appellee .Amanda Eyre Attorneys for Appellants 
230 South 500 East. Suite 400 5282 South Commerce Dr., Suite D-292 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84102 Murray, Utah 84107 
Attorney for Respondent Attorneys for Petitioners 
.Amanda Evre 
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in 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the majority's opinion affirming the ruling of the trial court deny Tyler Hansen 
due process of law, as guaranteed by the Founeenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States and by Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah, as defined in Bouie v City of Columbus, 387 U.S. 347 (1964)? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in deciding that Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1) 
was invalid, being in conflict with state statutes? 
3. Did the Court of Appeals err, by invalidating an ordinance without joining the City, 
contrary to the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-11? 
IY 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals decision to be reviewed is Hansen v. Eyre, reported at 2003 
UT App 274, P.3d . Judge Norman H. Jackson filed a dissenting opinion. A copy 
of the opinion is contained in the Appendix. 
V 
JURISDICTION 
This petition is taken from the Court of Appeals' affirmation of the Third District 
Court's Order denying a partial Summary Judgment Motion of Plaintiff'Peritioner on the 
1 
issue of whether Plaintiff had a right to act in conformance with an existing city ordinance 
that allowed a bicyclist to ride in designated bicycle lanes on either side of a city street. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-2a-4. 
YI 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES ORDINANCES. 
RULES and REGULATIONS 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations that pertain 
to this appeal are identified in the Table of Contents, and are fully set forth in the 
Appendix. 
VII 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of Proceedings. 
Petitioners, Tyler Hansen and The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, brought 
this action for negligence. They claimed, inter alia, that Tyler Hansen (hereinafter 
"Hansen") was lawfully riding his bicycle eastbound in the north bicycle lane on 200 
South in Salt Lake City, Utah on February 17, 2000. As he approached 500 East, the light 
was green for east-west traffic. 
At that time, Amanda S. Eyre (hereinafter "Eyre") was driving south on 500 East. 
She stopped at the red light on 200 South, and then commenced a right turn onto 200 
i 
South. As she crossed the bicycle lane on the north side of 200 South, her car and 
Hansen's bicycle collided. 
At the time of the collision, both Hansen and Eyre were in the course of their 
employment. Eyre's employer, the Nature Conservancy Group (hereinafter "Nature") was 
named as a defendant on a theory of respondent superior. Hansen was covered by Workers 
Compensation insurance at the time of the accident. The Workers Compensation Fund of 
Utah (hereinafter "the Fund") paid benefits to Hansen for his injuries, and was named as a 
plaintiff based on its statutory subrogation rights. 
The respondents claimed Hansen was negligent because he was not riding on the 
right hand side of 200 South. 
Petitioners asked the trial court to rule that pursuant to Salt Lake City Ordinance 
12.80.070(1), Hansen had a legal right to travel eastbound in the north bicycle lane on 200 
South as he approached 500 East. Respondents argued that State Law (Utah Code Ann. 
§§41-6-53 and 41-6-87) required Hansen to operate his bicycle on the right side of the 
roadway. They claimed the City Ordinance 12.80.070(1) conflicted with state law and was 
therefore invalid. See R. 109-126 
The trial court held a hearing and considered the parties' motions for partial 
summary judgment. Petitioners argued that the City Ordinance was valid on the date of 
the accident. Therefore, even if the trial court invalidated the Ordinance, the ruling could 
only have prospective application. In addition, since the Ordinance clearly allowed Hansen 
3 
to be in the left-hand bicycle lane, his conduct could not be negligence per se. On June 5, 
2002, the trial court denied the Motions for Summary Judgment and said: 
The Court finds that State law was and is (and probably always 
has been) clear that bicycles are to ride in the direction of motor 
vehicle traffic. 
An ordinance that purports to allow otherwise is in conflict with 
such state law . . . Thus, an ordinance that allows such bicycle 
traffic . . . may or may not be within the police powers of the 
city. The Court is not ruling on that aspect as it is without 
sufficient facts. 
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that 
Plaintiff was not justified bv ordinance nor state law in 
traveling in the direction he was against traffic (emphasis 
added). R. 164. 
The trial court also said the respondents failed to produce any evidence to support 
their claim that the Ordinance conflicted with state law. For that reason, the trial court 
expressly refused to rule the Ordinance was invalid. Id, 
Petitioners timely filed a petition for permission for an interlocutory appeal pursuant 
to Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. They felt that judicial economy would best 
be served if the trial court's inconsistent ruling were corrected prior to trial. 
On August 23, 2002, the Supreme Court granted permission to appeal, and later 
assigned ihe case to the Court of Appeals for disposition. 
On July 25, 2003, in a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the 
trial court. Moreover, they ruled the Ordinance was invalid. 
4 
On August 7, 2003, petitioners filed a petition for rehearing with the Court of 
Appeals. (Appendix). They pointed out that the Court had decided only one issue, to wit, 
that there was a conflict between state law and the city ordinance. Petitioners asked the 
Court to reconsider its opinion because it did not determine whether or not its ruling would 
be applied retroactively, which Hansen claimed would deny to him, under the holding in 
Bouie v City of Columbus, 387 U.S. 347 (1964), due process of law as guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and by Article I Section 7 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
On August 19, 2003, the Petition for Rehearing was denied. 
B, Summary of Facts. 
On February 17, 2000, Hansen was ridin? his bicycle eastbound in a designated 
bicycle lane on the north side of 200 South. As he approached 500 East, the traffic signal 
for eastbound traffic was green. 
Eyre was southbound on 500 East and stopped for a red light at 200 South. With the 
light still red, she commenced a right turn onto 200 South. As she rounded the comer, she 
collided with Hansen who was riding in the designated bicycle lane. 
At the time of the collision, Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1)(I) specifically 
allowed bicycle riders to ride on the left-hand side of a roadway within a designated bicycle 
lane. At the rime of the collision. Utah Code Annotated §41-6-87(3) required a bicycle rider 
to use a bicycle lane if one was available. 
5 
Petitioners are asking this Court to issue a Writ of Certiorari to consider the 
constitutional implications of the Court of Appeals ruling, as well as other errors which 
Petitioners believe are implicit in that decision. 
Unless the issues are determined at this time, equity and judicial economy will be 
frustrated. The parties and the Court of Appeals have spent considerable time and effort 
without resolving the errors manifested in the trial court's inconsistent ruling. Failure to 
resolve the due process issues, inherent in applying the appellate court's decision 
retroactively, will guarantee another appeal, and a second trial of this case. Petitioners 
presented the issue of whether or not the coun's decision to invalidate the ordinance could 
be applied retroactively to affect prior conduct. However, the Court of Appeals refused to 
discuss or rule on this issue. 
The Writ of Certiorari will allow this Court to address these issues, and give a 
definitive ruling on the issue of whether Hansen had a right to act in conformance to Utah 
Code Annotated § 41-6-87(3) and Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(H) and (I). This is a 
major question related to Hansen's negligence, if any. The trial court and appellate court 
have ruled that Hansen was not entitled to ride his bicycle in conformity with the provisions 
of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-87(3) and Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(H) and (I). 
6 
VIII 
ARGUMENTS 
Point I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS DENIED THE PETITIONERS DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW AS DEFINED IN BOUIE v. CITY OF COLUMBUS. 387 U.S. 347 (19641 
Respondents told the Court of Appeals that Hansen could not legally ride in the left 
bicycle lane because the city ordinance conflicted with state statutes that required bicycle 
riders to ride only on the right hand side of a roadway. Petitioners argued there was no 
conflict, but even if a conflict existed, invalidating the ordinance could not be applied 
retroactively to affect Hansen's conduct. The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
*he Constitution of the United States and those of Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of 
the State of Utah Due, as defined in Bouie. demand this result. 
The trial court refused to invalidate the ordinance. However, it then said Hansen 
was not entitled to rely on the ordinance. The trial court said: 
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that 
Plaintiff was not justified bv ordinance nor state law in 
traveling in the direction he was against traffic (emphasis 
added). R. 164. 
The trial court did not discuss how it reached this conclusion, and it completely failed to 
consider the constitutional implications of the decision. 
As a general rule, if a municipality has the power to pass an ordinance, but exercises 
the power in an unauthorized manner, the ordinance is still valid and binding until set aside 
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in legal proceedings instituted for that purpose. Regency Park L.P. v. City ofTopeka, 267 
Kan. 465, 981 P.2d 256 (1999); 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 20.14 (3d ed. Rev. 
1998); 56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporation § 315 at p. 353. This Court has held that an 
ordinance is presumptively valid and remains valid until overturned. Redwood Gym v. Salt 
Lake County Commission, 624 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1981); Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 
(Utah 1983). 
Neither the trial court nor the appellate court discussed or considered the effect that 
retroactive application would have on Hansen's constitutional right to due process of law.1 
The appellate court simply said the ordinance was invalid, and affirmed the judgment that 
Hansen had no legal right to rely upon an existing city ordinance.2 They invalidated the 
ordinance, even though the trial court said it had no evidence on that issue. The effect of 
the appellate court's decision is to criminalize Hansen's prior conduct. That denies him due 
process of law. 
1
 The usual effect of such a ruling would be for it to have only prospective 
application. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-5; Regency Park, LP v City ofTopeka, 267 Kan. 
465,981 P.2d 256; 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 20.14 (3d ed. Rev. 1998); 56 
Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations § 315 at p. 353. Retroactive application of this 
Court's decision would deny Hansen due process of law. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 387 
U.S. 347, 353-55(1964). 
2
 Because the trial court ruled that the jury* would need to be instructed that Hansen 
had no legal right to ride in the left hand bicycle lane, the only way such an instruction 
could be legally justified would be to retroactively invalidate the ordinance which 
allowed such travel and thereby remove the legal justification for Hansen's behavior on 
February 17,2000. 
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The majority opinion conflicts with the mandate ofBouie, supra, that prohibits 
retroactive application of a ruling on the validity of a statute or ordinance where retroactive 
application would criminalize actions previously taken in reliance on the language of the 
ordinance. 
Long established principles of due process of law preclude the retroactive 
application of the majority's ruling. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 387 U.S. 347, 353-55 
(1964); Keeler v. Superior Court, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617 (1970); Arizona Dept of 
Public Safety v. Superior Court of Maricopa Co., 190 Ariz. 490, 949 P.2d 983, 987, f.n.4 
(Ariz. App. 1997) rev. den. 192 Ariz 276, 964 P.2d 447 (1997); People v. Benney 151 P.2d 
1078, 1081 (Colo. 1987); Sodergren v. State, 715 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1986); State v. Byers, 
102 Idaho 159, 627 P.2d 788 (1981); State v Hull, 86 Wash.2d 527, 546 P.2d 912 (1976). 
Tyler Hansen rode in the left hand bicycle lane in reliance on the plain language of 
the ordinance. He was innocent of any intent to break the law. The law certainly cannot 
expect a lay person to realize that there might be a conflict between a city ordinance that 
expressly allows bicycles in the left bicycle lane and a state law. Not even the Court of 
Appeals was unanimous in finding a conflict existed. 
Retroactive application of the Court's ruling denies Hansen due process of law by 
criminalizing behavior that was innocent when it was done. It subjects Hansen to the claim 
he acred negligently when he followed the requirements of an extant city ordinance. Such a 
result clearly violates Hansen's due process rights. Id. It is well settled law that: 
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A State Supreme Court, no less than a state legislature, is barred 
from making conduct criminal which was innocent when it 
occurred through the process of judicial interpretation. 
People v. Escobar, 3 Cal. 4th 740, 752, 837 P.2d 1100, 1107 (1992); See Bouie, 
Supra. Due process protections ensure the citizenry fair warning of conduct that is 
proscribed by law. A person is entitled to act in reliance on the plain language of existing 
laws, without fear that their conduct may be later made punishable by a court who 
subsequently finds a conflict between state and local law. Bouie, Supra; People v. Frazer, 8 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 312, 982 P.2d 180 (1999). A major purpose of due process is to prevent the 
unfairness resulting from alternating the legal consequences of events or transactions after 
the fact. See People v. D.K.B., 843 P.2d 1326 (Col. 1993); Quails, Inc. v. Berryman, 789 
P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1990). Since Hansen's conduct conformed to the express language of the 
ordinance on February 17, 2000, a subsequent decision to invalidate the ordinance cannot 
make conduct illegal that was legal when done. Bouie, Supra. 
Poini II 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 41-6-53 AND 41-6-87, 
The Court erred in ruling the ordinance conflicts with state statutes and is therefore 
invalid. As observed by the dissent, the pertinent statutes are neither clear nor consistant. 
In Kimball Condominiums Owners Ass 'n v. County Bd. Of Equalization, 943 P.2d 642 
(Utah 1997), this Court held that a court should give effect to all terms of a statute and 
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harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose. Id. At 648. 
The appellate court failed to follow this mandate. 
There was no evidence of any kind presented to the trial court to support the 
conclusion that the city ordinance conflicted with state law, or that it was contrary to any 
legislative intent. The trial court said so. Thus, there was no evidence in the record to 
support the appellate court's conclusion that the intent of the Legislature in enacting Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 41-6-53 and 41-6-87 was to require without exception, that bicycles must 
alwa\s be operated on the right hand side of a roadway3. 
Similarly, there was no evidence in the record that the Legislature intended to 
preclude operation of bicycles in a left hand bicycle lane if such a lane was provided. As a 
matter of fact, no evidence of legislative intent was ever placed in front of the trial court. 
The trial court expressly declined to rule on the validity of the Salt Lake City Ordinance 
because the defendants failed to produce any evidence from which such a determination 
could be made.4 
3
 Such a conclusion erroneously presumes, without analysis, that a bicycle lane is 
part of the "roadway" as opposed to a "path adjacent to the roadway" as envisioned by the 
legislature when it enacted § 41-6-87(3) 
4
 As Justice Jackson observed in his dissent, the majority's conclusion is in error 
because in situations where there is only one bicycle path adjacent to a roadway, the 
majority analysis would put a rider, who wished to travel in the direction where to use the 
bicycle ]ane required him to travel on the left hand side would be required, in the position 
of either having to violate § 41-6-53 which requires travel on the right hand side of the 
roadway, or § 41-6 87(3) which requires use of the bicycle lane where provided with the 
result that no matter what he does, he acts in violation of law.. This was clearly not what 
the legislature intended. 
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When there appears to be a conflict between two statutes, the rule in Utah is that the 
more specific controls over the more general. Hall v. Dep 't of Corrections, 24 P.3d 958 
(Utah 2001). Certainly the express language of U.C.A § 41-6-87(3) and Salt Lake City 
Ordinance 12.80.070(H) and (I) are specific while the language of §§ 41-6-53 and 41-6-
87(1) are more general. 
The appellate court said Hansen argued he had "an absolute right to travel against 
the flow of traffic." This is not correct. Hansen has never claimed he should have a 
general right to "ride against traffic." What Hansen argued was that he was entitled to rely 
upon existing ordinances which require him to ride in a bicycle lane when one is provided, 
and allowed him to choose which bicycle lane he would use. 
The appellate court erred in its analysis. A bicycle lane is not part of the roadway. 
Hansen was not riding "on the roadway" when he was in the bicycle lane. In addition, there 
are exceptions to the general rule that vehicles (cars) must operate on the right side of a 
roadway. 
A "roadway" is defined as that portion of highway ... ordinarily used for vehicular 
travel, exclusive of the sidewalk, berm, or shoulder, even though any of them are used by 
persons riding bicycles ... Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-1(39). A "roadway" is defined as an area 
ordinarily used for vehicular traffic of all sorts, with the exception of areas where bicycle 
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travel is allowed. A bicycle lane adjacent to a "roadway" is not a part of that "roadway" 
because only bicycle travel is allowed. Vehicle travel therein is expressly prohibited.' 
This fact appears to have been recognized by the Legislature when Section 41-6-87 
was adopted. Article 11 of the Motor Vehicle Code (currently Sections 41-6-87 through 41-
6-90.5) was specifically adopted to regulate the operation of bicycles. At the time of the 
subject collision, U.C.A. § 41-6-87(1) provided that a bicycle traveling at less than normal 
speed should be operated as near as possible to the right side of the roadway. Certain 
exceptions were provided. If a separate bicycle path (lane) was provided, a bicycle rider 
was required to use the bicycle path (lane) and not the roadway. U.C.A. § 41-6-87(3). 
By this specific language, it is clear that the Legislature recognized that a bicycle 
]ane that prohibits cars is not part of the roadway. If the Legislature considered the bicycle 
lane to be part of the roadway, as the appellate court ruled, then the language of § 41-6-
87(3) requiring the bicyclist to use the "path" and not the "roadway" would be meaningless. 
Clearly, the Legislature in adopting subsection 3 envisioned municipalities designating 
bicycle paths alongside the roadway. In fact, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-17(h) specifically 
grants to cities the power to regulate bicycle traffic. 
- Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.52.140 provides: No motor vehicle shall at any time 
be driven within or through, or parked or stopped within a marked bicycle lane, except to 
briefly cross such lane to mm into an intersection, street, alley, driveway or other parking 
area. Any vehicle so turning must yield the right of way to all bicycles within the lane that 
are close enough to constitute an immediate hazard. No motor vehicle may use a bicycle 
lane as a turning lane. On all roads with no bicycle lane, operators of bicycles have the 
same rights, duties and responsibilities as operators of motor vehicles. 
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Pursuant to this enabling legislation, and in harmony with U.C.A. § 41-6-87, Salt 
Lake City adopted ordinances regulating bicycle travel. The ordinances prohibit other 
vehicles from using bicycle lanes. A bicyclist is required to travel in a bicycle lane when 
one is provided.6 Travel in a bicycle lane on either side of a street is allowed.7 Thus 
Hansen's use of a left hand bicycle lane was contemplated. 
Moreover, where only one bicycle lane exists, the appellate court ruling would 
prohibit a bicycle from traveling in other than one direction on that street. The existence of 
the bicycle lane, coupled with the prohibition to use the roadway when there is a bicycle 
lane, would preclude riding in both directions. 
Left hand use is logical. It allows a left hand turn to be made by a bicyclist without 
having to cross in front of other vehicle traffic that might be on the roadway. The majority 
opinion ignored the reality that bicycle lanes are created apart from the roadway for the 
limited purpose of providing a safe riding area for bicycles. They typically are constructed 
adjacent to the roadway as allowed by § 41-6-87(3). Motor vehicles cannot legally travel in 
a bicycle lane. The language of § 41-6-87(3) indicates they are not part of the "roadway." 
' Clearly, it is logical to assume that the city planners intended to create a safe lane of travel 
6
 Ordinance 12.80.070 provides: It is unlawful for operators of bicycles: (H) When 
riding upon a roadway marked with a bicycle lane to ride upon the sidewalk or any 
portion of the roadway outside the marked bicycle lane except when making a left turn. 
7
 Ordinance 12.80.070 provides: It is unlawful for operators of bicycles: (I) To ride 
upon the left-hand side of any street, except when they are within a marked bicycle lane 
or when riding upon a one-way street. 
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for bicyclists adjacent to certain city streets (roadways) where there would be no conflict 
between bicycles and motorized vehicles.8 
As the dissent correctly observed, the appellate court's decision will make 
U.C.A. § 41-6-87(3) meaningless. It is clear that the only purpose for adopting 
U.C.A. § 41-6-87(3) was to provide for the creation of bicycle lanes that would not be part 
of the general roadway, and which were to be used by bicycles and not cars. The dissent 
reached the correct conclusion. 
Point III 
THE VALIDITY OF SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 12.80.070(T> WAS NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR DECISION, 
Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1), as it existed on February 17, 2000, allowed a 
bicycle rider to ride in left-hand bicycle lanes in Salt Lake City. Plaintiffs asked the trial 
court to rule on a single issue, "does the ordinance give a rider the legal right to so ride?" 
Defendants opposed the motion for partial summary judgment. They claimed the 
ordinance was in conflict with state law. In response, plaintiffs argued that the defendants 
had failed to produce any evidence or other factual basis that would allow the court to 
declare the ordinance to be invalid. In addition, plaintiffs argued that even if the court 
8
 The scheme of the Salt Lake City Ordinances governing bicycle travel provides 
for separate travel paths for bicycles where bicycle traffic and other motor vehicle traffic 
are given separate areas in which to travel. This is clearly an effort to keep cars and 
trucks separate from bicycle traffic for safety reasons. So long as bicycles are in the 
bicycle lanes and other vehicles are in the traveled portion of the roadway, there is no 
conflict between bicycles and other traffic. 
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declared the ordinance invalid, such a ruling could not be applied retroactively to 
criminalize behavior that conformed to an extant city ordinance. 
U.C.A. §78-33-11 states: 
... In any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal 
... ordinance ... such municipality ... shall be made a party ... 
The defendants did not notify Salt Lake City Corporation of their claim that Ordinance 
12.80.070(1) was invalid. Salt Lake City was not made a party to the underlying action. 
The lower court specifically declined to rule that the city ordinance conflicted with 
the state statute because the defendants failed to meet their burden to show the ordinance to 
be invalid9. R. 164. Defendants did not appeal this ruling. 
However, without either party requesting such a ruling in their memoranda or 
argument, the trial court ordered: 
The jury- instructions will have to be properly tailored that 
Plaintiff was not justified bv ordinance nor state law in 
traveling in the direction he was against traffic (emphasis 
added). R. 164. 
Plaintiffs sought an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order regarding Hansen's 
right to rely upon an extant ordinance without such action being considered per se 
negligent. Plaintiffs reasoned that the validity of the ordinance was not really the 
controlling issue because unless the ordinance was determined to be invalid, and such 
9
 While the lower court refused to rule the ordinance invalid due to the lack of 
evidence to support such claim, Section 78-33-11 would preclude a ruling on the validity 
of the ordinance without Salt Lake City being a party to the proceeding. 
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ruling was given retroactive effect, plaintiffs' partial summary judgment motion was well 
taken. This was the theory behind plaintiffs appeal. 
Because the lower court had declined to rule the ordinance invalid, it did not rule on 
the issue of whether or not invalidation of the ordinance should be applied retroactively. 
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals discussed only one issue, "is the city ordinance 
valid." The majority said the ordinance is invalid, and then affirmed the trial court. The 
majority never discussed the issue of retroactive application of the ruling, and its effect on 
the trial court's order quoted above. 
The validity of the Salt Lake City ordinance should not have been decided by the 
Court of Appeals. If the majority felt that the issue of the validity of the ordinance was 
necessary to its decision, it should have remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing, with 
directions that Salt Lake City be made a party as required by U.C.A. Section 78-33-11. 
The constitutionality of a retroactive application of any ruling on the validity of the 
ordinance should have first been decided. The Court of Appeals ignored that issue. As set 
forth in Point I above, due process of law precludes retroactive application of a ruling that 
criminalizes conduct after the fact.10 If Hansen is correct that retroactive application is 
constitutionally impermissible, then it is immaterial whether or not the ordinance was 
10
 Unless a ruling that the ordinance is invalid is applied retroactively to 
criminalize behavior in conformity with the extant ordinance, Hansen had the legal right 
to ride in conformance with the language of the ordinance and, as a matter of law, his 
motion for partial summary judgment should have been granted. 
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rivalid. He had a legal right to act in conformance with the ordinance as a matter of law 
.nd his summary judgment motion should have been granted. 
In conclusion, the trial court said it did not have any evidence to determine the 
validity of the ordinance. However, it then made an inconsistent ruling by saying the 
plaintiff had no right to rely upon the ordinance. 
The issue of the ordinance's validity was not appealed. However, the appellate court 
Ietermined the ordinance was invalid, notwithstanding the absence of the City as a party. 
The majority ignored the issue of whether or not the ruling was prospective only, and by 
mplication applied their ruling retroactively. Thus, the Court of Appeals decision denies 
Hansen due process of law under the mandate of Bouie. 
The City of Salt Lake has never been joined as a party, and it was error to determine 
:he invalidity of its ordinance. U.C.A. § 78-33-11. 
A Writ of Certiorari should be granted to allow these errors to be corrected. 
IX 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the Majority Opinion affirming the ruling of the trial court effectively 
denies Petitioners due process of law as defined by the United States Supreme Court in 
Bouie. Moreover, as noted by the Dissent, the majority decision is in direct conflict with 
prior rulings of this Court, and failed to correctly construe and harmonize existing laws 
related to operation of bicycles in a designated bicycle lane. Finally, the majority opinion 
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held a city ordinance to be invalid, without the city being joined as a party. That violated 
the mandate of Utah Code Annotated Section 78-33-11. 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners respectfully request that the Court grant the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
Respectfully submitted this / 0 day of September, 2003. 
Mel. S. Martin, P.C. 
£X«^ 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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Addendum F 
Certified Copy of Salt Lake City Ordinance 
as Amended September 9, 2003 
SE? 2 5 " 0 3 o 0 2 - 1 
SALT LAKE CITY ORDNANCE 
No. £i, of 2003 
(Amending bic\c;es rules and regulations; 
AN ORDINALCE AMENDING SECTION 12.80.070, SALTLiKE CITf CODE, 
RELATING TO BICYCLE RULES AND REGULATIONS - LTNLAWFUL ACTS. 
Be it ordained hv the Citv Council of Salt Lake Citv. TlraV 
SECTION 1. That Section 12.80.070, Salt lake City Code, pertaining to bicycle rales and 
regulations - unlawful acts be, and the same hereby is, amended to read as follows: 
12.S0.070 Riding rales and regulations-Unlawful acts. 
A. It is ur.ia-.vfcl for operators of bicycles: 
1 • When riding upon a sidewalk to fail to yield the right-of-way to
 Pedes:rians and 
sounu a warning device be tore overtaking or passing any pedestrian. 
To net more than two abreast upon any street: 
3. To proceed other than single file upon any sidewalk: 
4. To carry extra passengers or carry any packages, bundles or articles which would 
require the removal of the hand or hands from the handlebars of the bicycle; 
To permit the bicycle such operator is riding to be towed by another vehicle or 
bicycle: 
•5- To ride any bicycle upon any sidewalk within the central traffic district, as defined 
:n Section 12.04.090 of this title, or its successor, and as described in Schedule 1 of thus title, set 
out in Chapter i 2.104, or its successor, and made a pan hereof by reference, or on any other area 
w:-re prohibi t by s;gns. provided however, the forego.ng shall nor apply to police officers in 
the scope and course of their entploymem; 
7. To ca..y more persons at a time than the number for which the bicycle is desisned 
to can:.' on seats firmly attached thereto; 
8. When riding upon a roadway marked with a bicycle lane to ride upon the sidewalk 
cr any portion of the roadway outside the marked bicycle lane except when making a-left turn; 
E. A person operating a bicycle upon a roadway at less than the normal speed of traffic at the 
time and place and under the conditions then existing shall ride as near as practicable to the right-
hand edge of the roadway except when: 
1. Overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, 
2. Preparing to make a left mm at an intersection or into a private road or driveway, 
3. Traveling straight through an intersection that has a right-rum only lane that is in 
conflict with the straight through movement, 
4. Reasonably necessary to avoid conditions that make it unsafe to continue along the 
right-hand edge of the roadway including fixed or moving objects, parked or moving vehicles, 
bicycles, pedestrians, animals, surface hazards, or a lane that is too narrow for a bicycle and a 
vehicle to travel safely side by side within the lane, or 
5. On a roadway, other than a limited-access highway, designed and signposted for one-
way traffic and which has two or more marked traffic lanes, m which case such person mavriae 
as near to the left side of the left through lane as is safe. 
C. A person operating a bicycle upon a roadway shall operate in the designated direct-ion of 
era inc. 
SECTION 2. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon the date of its first 
publication. 
: ' j ( , j . iyof S e p : a : n w 
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STATE OF UTAH, SEP 2 5 2003 
City and County of Salt Lake, 
I, Beverly Jones, Deputy City Recorder of Salt Lake City, Utah, do hereby certify that 
this document is a full, true and correct copy of Ordinance 64 cf 2003 amending Section 
12.80.070, Salt Lake City Code, relating to bicycle njles and regulations - unlawful acts. 
Passed by Salt Lake City, Utah Council action on September 9, 2003. 
Published on September 22, 2003. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the corporate seal cf 
said City, this 13th day cf September, 2003. 
Addendum G 
Pertinent Constitutional and Statutory Provisions 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENTS A m e n d . XTV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Cimenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
poincinent.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. (Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
TRAFFIC RULES AMD REGULATIONS 41-6-1 
Section 
41-6-155. 
41-6-156 co 41 
41-6-163.5. 
41-6-163.6. 
41-6-163.7. 
41-6-163.S. 
41-6-164. 
41-6-164.5. 
41-6-165. 
41-6-165.5. 
41-6-166. 
41-6-167. 
41-6-168. 
41-6-169. 
41-6-169.10 
Vehicles and equipment must be 
in safe mechanical condition. 
-6-163. Renumbered. 
Repealed. 
Emissions inspection — County 
program (Effective until 
January 1, 19991. 
Emissions inspection — County 
program [Effective J a n u a r v 1, 
19991. 
Development of standardized 
emissions inspection and 
maintenance program. 
Diesel emissions program — 
Implementation — Monitor-
ing. 
Repealed. 
Violation of chapter. 
Requiring or knowingly permit-
ting driver to unlawfully oper-
ate vehicle. 
Government-owned vehicles 
subject to chapter. 
Appearance upon arrest for mis-
demeanor — Setting bond. 
Notice to appear in court — 
Contents — Promise to com-
ply — Signing — Release 
from custody — Official mis-
conduct. 
Violation of promise to appear 
as misdemeanor — Appear-
ance by counsel. 
Arrests without warrants . 
Repealed. 
Section 
41-6-170. Record of violation not admis-
sible in civil action. 
Conviction shall not affect cred-
ibility as a witness. 
Improper disposition or cancel-
lation of notice to appear or 
traffic citation — Official mis-
conduct — Misdemeanor. 
Keeping of records — Making 
and forwarding of abstract 
upon conviction or forfeiture 
of bail — Form and contents 
— Public inspection — OrH-
cial misconduct. 
Repealed. 
Short title of act. 
Conflict with Federal Motor 
Carrier Safety Regulations. 
41-6-176 to 41-6-180. Repealed. 
41-6-171. 
41-6-172. 
41-6-173. 
41-6-174. 
41-6-175. 
41-6-175.5 
Art ic le 17 
M o t o r Vehicle Seat Belt Usage 
41-6-181 Short title. 
41-6-182. Driver and front seat passen-
gers. 
41-6-183. Exceptions. 
J-1-6-1S4. Enforcement. 
41-6-185 Penalty for violation. 
41-6-136'. Compliance — Civil litigation. 
Ar t ic le 13 
Tow T r u c k a n d I m p o u n d R e g u l a t i o n 
[ R e n u m b e r e d ] 
41-6-137 41-6-1S8. Repealed. 
41-6-189 to 41-6-193. Renumbered. 
ARTICLE 1 
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS 
41-6-1. Definitions. 
* ^ - A l £ ? meaSa" street or highway intended to provide access to the 
rear or side of lots orJ>uildings in urban districts and not intended .or 
through vehicular traffic. ^ f i T 1 0J in «e^on <n-22-2. (O) •'All-terrain tvpe I vehicle'' is used as defined in ^e-.on . . - - -
i -Authorized "emergency vehicle" means fire department vehicle,, 
n o l i ven c S m b u i a n c e s . and other publicly or private^ ^ e d v e m c i e s 
£ d e b a t e d bv the commissioner of the Department of Public bafeyy 
M -Bicvc^ i - a n s everv device propelled by human power upon w m,n 
any person maynde, having twotandem wheels, except scooters and 
^ { ^ s t P m ^ n s *verv motor vehicle designed for carrying more than 15 
p a ^ n f c S i d l e d for.the ^ J ^ P ™ £ £ S £ 5 
vehicle, other than a taxicao, designed ana ube^ IUI 
persons for compensation. 
371 
41-6-1 MOTOR VEHICLES 
(o) Controlied-access highway" means every highwav, street, or road-
way to or from which owners or occupants of abutting lands and other 
persons have no legal right of access, except at points as determined bv the 
P u ° \ l c authority having jurisdiction over the highwav, street, or roadwav. 
(i) Crosswalk" means: 
(a) that part of a roadway at an intersection included within the 
connections of the lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of 
the highway measured from the curbs or, in the absence of curbs from 
the edges of the traversable roadway; and in the absence of a sidewalk 
on one side of the roadway, that part of a roadway included within the 
extension of the lateral lines of the existing sidewalk at right angles 
to the centerline; or 
(b) any portion of a roadway at an intersection or elsewhere 
distinctly indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or other markings 
on the surface. 
(8) •'Department" means the Department of Public Safety. 
(9) "Divided highway" means a highway divided into'two or morp 
roadways by unpaved intervening space or by a phvsical barrier or by a 
clearly indicated dividing section constructed to imDede vehicular traffic 
(10) "Electric assisted bicycle" means a moped with an electric motor 
witti a power output of not more than 1,000 watts, which is not capable of 
propelling the device at a speed of more than 20 miles per hour on level 
ground, and which is not capable of increasing the speed of the device 
when human power is used to propel the device at more than ?0 miles oe-
hour. ^ * 
(11) "Explosives" means any chemical compound or mechanical mixture 
commonly used or intended for the purpose of producing an explosion and 
which contains any oxidizing and combustive units or other ingredients in 
proportions, quantities, or packing so that an ignition bv fire friction 
concussion, percussion, or detonator of any part of the' compound or 
mixture may cause a sudden generation of highly heated gases, and the 
resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructive effects 
on contiguous objects or of causing death or serious bodilv injury 
(12) "Farm tractor" means every motor vehicle designed and used 
primarily as a farm implement, for drawing plows, mowing machines and 
otner implements of husbandry. 
(13) "Flammable liquid" means any liquid which has a flashpoint of 100-
degrees F. or less, as determined by a tagliabue or equivalent closed-cup 
test device. ^ 
(14) "Gross weight" means the weight of a vehicle without load olus the 
weignt or any load on the vehicle. 
(15) "Highway" means the entire width between property i^nes of everv 
way or place of any nature when any part of it is otien to" the u*e of the 
puohc as a matter of right for vehicular travel. 
(16) -Intersection" means the area embraced wichin the orolongaron or 
connection or the lateral curblines. or, if none, then the lateral boundary 
nnes or the roadways of two or more highways which join one another 
(a; Wnere a highway includes two roadways 30 feet or more apart, 
every crossing of each roadway of the divided highway by an inter-
secting highway is a separate intersection; if the intersecting highwav 
also includes two roadways 30 feet or more apart, then eve™ crossing 
ot two roadways of the highways is a separate intersection" 
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(b) The junction of an alley with a street or highway is not an 
intersection. 
(17) "Local authorities" means ever/ county, municipal, and other local 
board or body having authority to enact laws relating to traffic under the 
constitution and laws of the state. 
^ (18) "Metal tire*7 means a tire, the surface of which in contact with the 
highway is wholly or partly of metal or other hard nonresilien: material 
(19) "Mobile home** means: 
(a) a trailer or semitrailer which is designed, constructed, and 
equipped as a dwelling place, living abode, or sleeping place either 
permanently or temporarily, and is equipped for use as a conveyance 
on streets and highways; or 
(b) a trailer or a semitrailer whose chassis and exterior shell is 
designed and constructed for use as a mobile home, as denned in 
Subsection (19Xa), but which is instead used permanently or tempo-
rarily for the advertising, sales, display, or promotion of merchandise 
or services, or for any other commercial purpose except the transpor-
tation of property for hire or the transportation of property for 
distribution by a private carrier. 
(20) "Moped" means a motor-driven cycle having both pedals to permit 
propulsion by human power, and a motor which produces not more than 
two brake horsepower and which is not capable of propelling the cycle at 
a speed in excess of 30 miles per hour on level ground. If an internal 
combustion engine is used, the displacement may not exceed 50 cubic 
centimeters and the moped shall have a power drive system that functions 
directly or automatically without clutching or shifti ng bv the operator 
after the drive system is engaged. A moped includes an electric assisted 
bicycle and a motor assisted scooter. 
(21) "Motor assisted scooter** means a self-propelled device with at least 
two wheels in contact with the ground, a braking system capable of 
stopping the unit under typical operating conditions, a gas or* electric 
motor not exceeding 40 cubic centimeters, a deck design for a person to 
stand while operating the device, and the ability to be propelled by human 
power alone. 
(22) "Motor vehicle'' means every vehicle which is self-propelled and 
every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead 
trolley wires, but not operated upon rails, except vehicles moved solely by 
human power and motorized wheel chairs. 
(23) ""Motorcycle"7 means every motor vehicle, other than a tractor, 
having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel with 
not more than three wheels in contact with the ground. 
(24) ~Motor-dnven cycle" means every motorcycle and motor scooter. 
moped, electric assisted bicycle, motor assisted scooter, and every motor-
ized bicycle having an engine with less than 150 cubic centimeters 
displacement or having a motor which produces not more than five 
horsepower. 
(25> "Official traffic-control devices" means all signs, signals, markings, 
and devices not inconsistent with this chapter placed or erected by 
authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction, for the pumase of 
regulating, warning, or guiding traffic. 
(26) ''Off-highway implement of husbandry" is used as denned under 
Section 41-22-2. 
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(27) "Off-highway vehicle" is used as defined under Section 41-22-2. 
(23) "Operator" means any person who is in actual physical control of a 
vehicle. 
(29) "Park" or "parking'1 means the standing of a vehicle, whether 
occupied or not, otherwise than temporarily for the purpose of and while 
actually engaged in loading or unloading property or passengers. 
(30) "Peace officer" means any peace officer authorized under Title 53, 
Chapter 13, Peace Officer Classifications, to direct or regulate traffic or to 
make arres ts for violations of traffic laws. 
(31) "Pedestrian" means any person afoot. 
(32) "Person" means every natural person, firm, copartnership, associa-
tion, or corporation. 
(33) "Pole trailer" means every vehicle without motive power designed 
to be drawn by another vehicle and attached to the towing vehicle by 
means of a reach, or pole, or by being boomed or otherwise secured to the 
towing vehicle, and is ordinarily used for transporting long or irregular 
shaped loads such as poles, pipes, or structural members generally 
capable of sustaining themselves as beams between the supporting 
connections. 
(34) "Private road or driveway" means every way or place in private 
ownership and used for vehicular travel by the owner and those having 
express or implied permission from the owner, but not by other persons. 
(35) "Railroad" means a carrier of persons or property upon cars 
operated upon stationary rails. 
(36) "Railroad sign or signal" means a sign, s ignal or device erected by 
authority of a public body or official or by a railroad and intended to give 
notice of the presence of railroad tracks or the approach of a railroad t ra in . 
(37) "Railroad train" means a locomotive propelled by any form of 
energy, coupled with or operated without cars, and operated upon rails. 
(38) "Right-of-way" means the right of one vehicle or pedestrian to 
proceed in a lawful manner in preference to another vehicle or pedestrian 
approaching under circumstances of direction, speed, and proximity which 
give rise to danger of collision unless one grants precedence to the other. 
(39) "Roadway" means tha t portion of highway improved, designed, or 
ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the sidewalk, berm, or 
shoulder, even though any of them are used by persons riding bicycles or 
other human-powered vehicles. If a highway includes two or more sepa-
rate roadways, roadway refers to any roadway separately but not to all 
roadways collectively. 
(40) "Safety zone" means the area or space officially set apart within.a 
roadway for the exclusive use of pedestrians and which is protected, 
marked, or indicated by adequate signs as to be plainly visible at all t imes 
while sec apart as a safety zone. 
(41) "School bus" means every motor vehicle that complies with the 
color and identification requirements of the most recent edition of "Mini-
mum Standards for School Buses" and is used to transport school children 
to or from school or school activities. This definition does not include 
vehicles operated by common carriers in transportation of school children 
to or from school or school activities. 
(42) "Semitrailer" means a vehicle with or without motive power, other 
than a pole trailer, designed for carrying persons or property and for being 
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drawn by a motor vehicle, and constructed so that some part of its weight 
and that of its load rests upon or is carried by another vehicle. 
(43) "Shoulder area" means that area of the hard-surfaced highway 
separated from the roadway by a pavement edge line as established m the 
current approved "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices," or that 
portion of the road contiguous to the roadway for accommodation of 
stopped vehicles, for emergency use, and lateral support. 
(44) ^Sidewalk" means that portion of a street between the curb lines, or 
the lateral lines of a roadway, and the adjacent property lines intended for 
the use of pedestrians. 
(45) "Solid rubber tire'' means ever/ tire of rubber or other resilient 
material which does not depend upon compressed air for the support of the 
load. 
(46) "Stand" or "standing" means the halting of a vehicle, whether 
occupied or not, other than temporarily for the purpose of and while 
actually engaged in receiving or discharging passengers. 
(47) ""Stop" when required means complete cessation from movement. 
(48) uStopn or "stopping" when prohibited means any halting even 
momentarily of a vehicle, whether occupied or not. except when necessary 
to avoid conflict with other traffic or when in compliance with the 
directions of a peace officer or official traffic-control device. 
(49) "Traffic" means pedestrians, ridden or herded animals, vehicles, 
and other conveyances either singly or together while using any highway 
for the purpose of travel. 
(50) 'Traffic-control signal" means any device, whether manually, elec-
trically, or mechanically operated, by which traffic is alternately directed 
to stop and oermitted to proceed. 
(51)" "Trailer" means every vehicle with or without motive power, other 
than a pole trailer, designedfor carrying persons or property and for being 
drawn by a motor vehicle and constructed so that no part of its weight 
rests upon the towing vehicle. 
(52) 'Truck" means every motor vehicle designed, used, or maintained 
primarily for the transportation of property. 
(53) 'Truck tractor" means a motor vehicle designed and used primarily 
for drawing other vehicles and constructed to carry a part of the weight of 
the vehicle and load drawn by the truck tractor. 
(54) "Urban district" means the territory contiguous to and including 
any street, in which structures devoted to business, industry or dwelling 
houses are situated at inter/als of less than 100 feet, for a distance of a 
quarter of a mile or more. 
(55) "Vehicle" means ever/ device in, upon, or by which any person or 
property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices 
used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks. 
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 41-45-1, e n a c t e d by L. 
979. ch. 242. 1 1: 198b, ch. 36. 1 1: 1987. ch . 
33 , } 1; 19S7, ch . 162. <* 23: 1996. ch. 208. ^ 
; 1998. ch . 245, * 2: 1998. ch . 2S2. * 17. 
R e p e a l s a n d Reenae t rnencs . — Laws 
979.*ch. 242, 5 1 repealed former § 41-6-1. as 
amended by L. 1975 (1st S.S.;. ch. 9, 4 5. 
*~ting definitions, and enacted present § 41-6-
A m e n d m e n t No tes . — The 1996 amend-
ment, effective Aonl 29, 1996, added Subsec-
tion (10 ), retiesi^natintj the subsequent subsec-
tions accordingly: m Subjection (20) inserted ~A 
mopea .nciudes .." at the end: ana in Subsection 
'23) added *moped. electric assisted bicycle."' 
The 199S amendment by ch. 245. effective 
May 4. 1998. made a minor stylistic change m 
Subsection \ 19Mb), added "and a motor assisted 
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scooter" at the end of the last sentence in 
Subsection '20); and added Subsection '21), 
redesignating subsections accordingly. 
The 1998 amendment by ch. 232. effective 
May 4, 1998, made a minor stvlistic change in 
Subsection '19)(b); and in Subsection (29) (Sub-
section (30) in the reconciled version) substi-
tuted "any peace officer" for "everv law enforce-
ment officer^ and -Title 53, Chapter 10, Peace 
Officer Classifications" for "Section 77-la- l ." 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Compi ler ' s No tes . — An original chapter 
reference appearing in the 1998 amendments 
to this section was changed by the Office of 
Legislative Research and General Counsel to 
reflect a technical renumbering. 
Cross -References . — Handicapped per-
sons, parking privileges, § 41-la-414. 
Municipal regulations, § 10-8-30. 
Words and phrases defined by statute, con-
struction of, § 68-3-11. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Ambulance service. 
Construction and application. 
Crosswalks. 
Intersection. 
Pedestrian. 
Right-of-way statutes. 
Roadways. 
Vehicle. 
— Horse. 
Cited. 
A m b u l a n c e se rv ice . 
Ambulance operated by service registered 
with public service commission, involved in 
accident while making emergency run, was 
"authorized emergency vehicle" within mean-
ing of s ta tu te and was in privileged status with 
respect to speed limits and traffic signals de-
spite contentions that ambulance driver was 
negligent as mat ter of law for exceeding sueed 
limit and ignoring traffic signals, that ambu-
lance service was not "public service corpora-
tion" within the meaning of law, and that am-
bulance service was not authorized by local 
authority."' Howe v. Jackson, 18 Utah 2d 269 
421P.2d 159(1966). 
C o n s t r u c t i o n a n d a p p l i c a t i o n . 
This title pertains preponderantly to motor 
vehicles noc confined to tracks, such as automo-
biles and motorcycles and the like. It is a 
Lr.::orm Act designed to n-<ruiate nonraii ve-
hicular traffic on streets, and. therefore, ex-
pressly excludes steam trains, trolley and m-
terurcan cars. Thorpe v. Bamberger R.R., 107 
L'tan 265, 153 R2d 541 (1944). discussing re-
peal of former laws and holding that the power 
to require interurban trains :o stoo at through 
streets was. by the legislature, granted to cities 
entirely independent of Title 41 , U.C.A. 1953, 
ar.d referring to Title 10. which contains most 
or tne power granted by the legislature to cities 
and towns. 
Prior^to 1949 amendment, this section ex-
cluded from the operation of this act "vehicles 
used exclusively upon stationary rails and 
tracks". Thorpe v. Bamberger R.R., 107 Utah 
265, 153 P2d 541 (1944). See present Subsec-
tion (53), defining 'Vehicle". 
Crosswa lks . 
Even though many people may cross a street 
at a certain place, a crosswalk is not created 
since use, by itself, does not establish a right-
of-way for pedestrians. Langiois v. Rees, 10 
Utah "2d 272, 351 P.2d 638 (1960). 
The statutory definition implied that there 
was an unmarked crosswalk only if a s t r ee t s 
sidewaik lor the edge of the traversable road-
way) was intersected and continued on and if a 
pedestrian way terminated at an intersection, 
it terminated without crossing the street unless 
it continued as a marked crosswalk. Langiois v. 
Rees, 10 Utah 2d 272, 351 P.2d 63S (1960). 
I n t e r s e c t i o n . 
Jury was properly instructed that site of 
collision was ^intersection** under s ta tu te pro-
hibiting passing another vehicle without 100 
feet of intersection in light of evidence that 
crossing road intersected main highway from 
both east and west and crossed it a t right 
angles, that main highway was widened for 
about 1/10 of a mile in both directions to pro-
vide extra lane for acceleration and decelera-
tion in entering or leaving highway and that 
there were stop signs at both east and west side 
to warn oncoming trafiac; result was not 
changed by fact that the crossing road was only 
infrequently traveled dirt road and not readily 
observable to main highway traveler. 
Hathawav v. .Man:. 21 Utah 2d 33. 439 P.2d 850 
'1963). 
P e d e s t r i a n . 
"Pedestrian,T includes a person whose car has 
been disabled, so § 41-6-82(2), prescribing du-
ties of a pedestrian on a highway, applied in a 
case in which a driver of a disabled vehicle was 
hit by the side mirror of a passing truck. 
Marquez v. Pepsi Coia Bottling Co., S3S R2d 
660 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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41-8-18, Uniform applicat ion of chapter — Effect of local 
ordinances-
The provisions of this chapter are applicable and uniform throughout this 
state and in all of its political subdivisions and municipalities. A local authority 
may not enact or enforce any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions 
of this chapter. Local authorities may, however, adopt ordinances consistent 
with this chapter, and additional traffic ordinances which are not in conliict 
v/ith this chapter. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 7; C. 1943, Cross-References. — Powers and duties of 
57-7-84; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 9. all acies, troiiLc regulations, § 10-8-30. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Homsby v. Corporation of Presiding 
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saina, 753 P.2d S29 (.Utah Cc. Aop. 19SS). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles statutes or ordinances forbidding automotive 
and Hi^nway TrnSc § 19. "cruising" — practice of driving1 repeatedly 
C.J.S. — 50 CJ.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. through loop of public reads through city, 37 
A-LJEL — Validity, construction, and enect of A.L.R.4th 1110. 
41-6-17. Regula tory powers of local authorities — Traffic-
control device affecting state highway — Neces-
sity of e rec t ing traffic-control devices. 
(1) Trie provisions of this chapter do nor prevent local authorities, with 
respect to highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable 
exercise of police power, from: 
(a) regulating or prohibiting stopping, standing, or parking; 
(b) regulating traffic by means of peace officers or official traffic-control 
devices; 
(c) regulating or prohibiting precessions or assemblages on the high-
ways; 
(d) designating particular highways or roadways for use by traffic 
moving in one direction under Section 41-6-80; 
(e) establishing speed limits for vehicles in public parks, which super-
sede Section 41-6-4S regarding speed limits; 
(f) designating any highway as a through highway or designating any 
intersection or junction of roadways as a stop or yield intersection or 
junction; 
»'g; restricting the use of highways under Section 72-7-403; 
\h) regulating the operation of bicycles and requiring the registration 
and inspection of them, including requiring a registration fee: 
(i) regulating or prohibiting the turning of vehicles or specified types of 
vehicles; 
(j) altering or establishing speed limits under Section 41-6-4S: 
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(2) This section does not prohibit attaching a trailer or semitrailer to a 
bicycle or moped if that trailer or semitrailer has been designed for attach-
ment. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 73; C 1943, 
57-7-150; L. 1973, ch. 33, § 29; 1987, ch. 138, 
§ 91. 
41-6-87. Opera t ion of bicycle or moped on and use of 
r o a d w a y — Duties , prohibitions. 
(1) A person operating a bicycle or a moped upon a roadway at less, than the 
normal speed of traffic at the time and place and under the conditions then 
existing shall ride as near as practicable to the right-hand edge of the roadway 
except when: 
(a) overtaking and passing another bicycle or vehicle proceeding in the 
same direction; 
(b) preparing to make a left turn at an intersection or into a private 
road or driveway; or 
(c) reasonably necessary to avoid conditions including, but not limited 
to, fixed or moving objects, parked or moving vehicles, bicycles, pedestri-
ans, animals, surface hazards, or substandard width lanes that make it 
unsafe to continue along the right-hand eagQ. In this subsection, "substan-
dard width lane* means a lane that is too narrow for a bicycle and a vehicle 
to travel safely side by side within the lane. 
(2) Persons riding bicycles or mopeds upon a roadway may not ride more 
than two abreast except on paths or parts of roadways set aside for the 
exclusive use of bicycles. Persons riding two abreast may not impede the 
normal and reasonable movement of traffic and on -a laned roadway shall ride 
within a single lane. 
(3) If a usable path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to a roadway, 
bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway. 
History: L. 1941, ch- 52, § 74; C 1943, 
57-7-151; L. 1943, ch, 65, § 1; 1978, ch. 33, 
§ 30; 1987, ch. 138, § 92; 1989, ch. 44, § 1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles A-LJR. — Sufficiency of evidence to raise last 
and Highway Traffic § 249. clear chance doctrine in cases of automobile 
C.J.S. — 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 396(1) collision with pedestrian or bicyclist — modem, 
ec sea. cases, 9 A.L.R.5th 826. 
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ARTICLE 7 
REGULATIONS APPLICABLE' TO DRIVING 
ON RIGHT SIDE OF HIGHWAY, 
OVERTAKING, PASSING AND 
OTHER RULES OF 
THE ROAD 
41-6-53. Duty to opera te vehicle on r ight side of roadway 
— Exceptions* 
(1) On all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be operated upon the 
right half of the roadway, except: 
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the 
same direction under the rules governing that movement; 
(b) when an obstruction requires operating the vehicle to the left of the 
center of the roadway, but the operator shall yield the right-of-way to all 
vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portions 
of the highway within a distance constituting an immediate hazard; 
(c) on a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the 
applicable rules; or 
(d) on a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic. 
(2) On ail roadways a vehicle proceeding at less than the normal speed of 
traffic under the existing conditions shall be operated in the right-hand lane 
then available for traffic, or as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or 
edge of the roadway, except when overtaking and passing another vehicle 
proceeding in the same direction or when preparing for a.left turn at an 
intersection or into a private road or driveway. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Hi s to ry : L. 1941, ch . 52, § 43; C. 1943, 
57-7-120; L. 1949. ch . 65 . § 1; 1975, ch. 207, 
3 14; 1987, ch. 138, § 52. 
ANALYSIS 
Backing. 
Bicycle and truck-
Effect of passing from right to center. 
"Half or* the roadway'* construed. 
Instructions. 
Negiigence. 
Presumptions. 
0 ues tion for jury. 
Violation as evidence of negligence. 
Cited. 
B a c k i n g . 
Statutes requiring tha t vehicles keep to right 
have no applicability to backing. Naisbitt v. 
£ggett? 5 Utah 2d 5,*295 ?.2d 332 (1955). 
Bicycle a n d t r u c k . 
The driver of a truck who was on right side of 
street and was not on, near to, or approaching a 
crossing where both vehicles and pedestrians 
might pass either or both ways had the right to 
relax his vigilance and was not required to do 
more than to maintain such lookout as would 
prevent his colliding or coming in contact with 
anyone on his side of street. Richards v. Palace 
Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409, 1S6 P. 429 (1919). 
Effect of p a s s i n g from r i g h t to cen ter . 
While in case a street or highway is not used 
by others one may drive on any part thereof. 
yet. when a motorist or bicyclist passes from 
right to left of the center of the street, he icses 
some of his rights, and he may not be heard to 
complain of the conduct of those who are on the 
proper side of street to the same extent as 
though he also were on the proper side. 
Richards v. Palace Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409. 
1S6 P. 439 (1919). 
In action by bicyclist for personal injuries 
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sustained as result of collision with automobile 
at intersection, instruction that motorist had 
right to presume that every other person would 
obey law by traveling on right-hand side of 
road, and that no duty rested upon motorisc to 
stop or change course of automobile until he 
had reason to believe that plaintiff was travel-
ing on wrong side of street, was properly re-
fused where it was disputed question as to 
whether bicyclist was on wrong side of roadway. 
Cheney v. Buck, 56 Utah 29, 189 P. 31 (1920). 
"Half of the roadway'' construed. 
The reasonable interpretation of "half of the 
roadway*' is tha t it means half of the roadway 
as it exists at the time it is being traveled and 
not half of the roadway as it may have been laid 
out originally. Patton v. Kirkmam 109 Utah 
487, 167 P.2d 282 (1946). 
I n s t r u c t i o n s . 
Where collision takes place upon street hav-
ing four trafnc lanes, it is proper to instruct as 
to duty of defendant to use right trafSc lane. 
and as to duty of the respective parties to use 
lane 4 ra ther than lane 3, where the evidence 
warrants such instruction. Thomas v. Sadieir, 
108 Utah 552, 162 P.2d 112 (1945). 
N e g l i g e n c e . 
The strongest kind of presumption of negli-
gence prevails against party driving on wrong 
side of road. Staton v. Western Macaroni Mfg. 
Co., 52 Utah 426, 174 P. 321 (1913). 
P r e s u m p t i o n s . 
Where one who is operating his vehicle on 
right side of street makes survey of condition of 
street ahead of him. and in doing so he observes 
no one coming on his side of street, but sees one 
or more coming towards him on opposite side of 
street, he has right to assume that such person 
will continue onward on opposite side of street, 
and not encroach upon his side. Richards v. 
Palace Laundr / Co., 55 Utah 409, 136 P. 439 
(1919). 
Question for jury. 
In action by bicyclist for personal injuries 
sustained as result of collision with automobile 
at intersection, whether bicyclist was on right 
side of traveled road held for jury. Cheney v. 
Buck, 56 Utah 29, 189 P. 31 (1920). 
In personal-injury action arising out of auto-
mobile-truck collision on highway, ultimate 
question of fact as to which of two drivers failed 
to keep his vehicle upon proper side of road was 
for jury. Moser v. Zion's CO-OD. Mercantile Inst., 
114 Utah 53, 197 P.2d 136 (1943). 
Violat ion as e v i d e n c e of negl igence . 
Violations of standards ot safer/ set by stat-
ute are regarded as prima facie evidence of 
negligence subject only to justification or ex-
cuse. Platis v. United States. 283 F. SUDD. 254 
(D. Utah 1968), aff'd, 409 ?.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 
1969). 
Ci ted in State v. Sierra, ' 
Ct. App. 1988). 
54 P2d 972 (Utah 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 268. 
A.LJR- — Automobiles: liability for U-turn 
collisions, 53 A.L.R.4th 349. 
41-6-53.5. Left lane restrictions — Exceptions — Other 
lane restrictions. 
(1) A person operating a vehicle drawing a trailer or semitrailer or operating 
a vehicle or combination of vehicles with a gross vehicle weight of 12,001 or 
more pounds may not operate the vehicle or vehicles in the left most lane of a 
highway or section of a highway if the highway has three or more lanes in the 
same direction. 
(2) This section does not apply to a vehicle: 
(a) preparing to turn left or taking a highway split or exit on the left; 
(b) responding to emergency conditions; 
(c) avoiding actual or potential tramc moving onto the ri^ht lane from 
an acceleration or merging lane; or 
(d) following direction signs that direct use of a designated lane. 
(3) (a) The Department of Transportation or local authorities may desig-
nate a specific lane or lanes of travel for any type of vehicle on a highway 
or portion of a highway under their respective jurisdiction for the:" 
(i) safetv of the public; 
.JUDICIAL CODE 
/ c - i o - l i 
• -«, , ,• C 1943. Cross-Heferences. - A w a r d of costs. Rul-
History: L. 1951. en. o8, > 1. <<• ^ ^
 R C_R 
Supp., 104-33-10. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
mcurred because of litigation which was not 
Attorney fees. resorted to in good faith, but was merely_spiM-
Authonzadon to award-costs ° * ™ * ^
 M . contentious or obstructive. Western C*,. £ 
equitabie and i « ^ ^ ^ S Su , Co. , Marchant, 615 P.2d 423 ,Lton 19,0,. 
attorneys fees u sucn ie« 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
• r c in C J S — 26 P..J.S Declarator; Judgments 
Utah Law Review. -At to rneys Fees in W * . 
Judgments 4 253. 
7Q 3 3 - 1 ! Par t ies . 
m e n ^ e c l a r a t o r y r e ^ 
or claim any interest w h i c h ^ ^ b / f ^ ^ o a r t i e S to the proceeding. 
declaration sha l prejudice the r g h s o ^ p e so ^
 o r c Q u n 
In any proceeding which imol es toe ™ ^
 R b m a d e a p a r t y , and 
ordinance or franchise ^ ^ ^ ^ t e w state franchise or permit is 
shall be entitled to b e ^ i * £ ^ f ^
 b e s e r , e d with a copy of the 
a l l i e d to be invalid toe attorney
 0 
proceeding and be entitled to be heard. 
His to ry L. 1941. ch. 53. S 1; C. 1943. ' pox.es. Rule ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
^ s s ^ r e n c e , - Necessary joinder of Rule 4ld<l* j>. UJLC J-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
too tangential to make it a f ^ j f j * 
A.-ALVSB declarator / judgment action ; Anschut Corp 
Natural Gas Pipeline Co.. 6o2 F. 3upp . -M 
Adverse interests.
 U t a h i g 8 6 ) 
"Any interest. 
Validity of state statutes. Validity of state statutes. 
—Liauor control. 
Notification of attorney gene.-i. —Liquor control. 
Z S r S o n . _ _ N o t i f i c a t i o n of a t p r n ^ general 
Attorney general snould have -ee- nu . 
where there was no justiciable controversy oe- _ ? e Q a l s - a t u : e . 
cause the interest of the parties was not _a-
. . a «e Biickaan v. Salt Lone Count>. 1« ouia steril ization. 
2a" i V 3 7 5 R2d 756 ,1962). Attorney general ^ ^ ^ ^ i 
defendants in action seeding « — • ,Jo u i d 
-Any interest. „f this section is meat on whether voluntary
 5ter.i^.a 
.Although the language of this »ec.o
 c o n s t k u t s a felony unaer S 62A".^lJ?i "97-;!. 
worded broadly, the definition.£ ^ ^
 v. R a E i p l o n , 23 Utah 2d 36.49. P.2d 343 
must have limits beyond wuicn the i n c e s t 
660 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS „
 0 o , 0 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-33.12.
 C h a p t e r t o b e j . ^ ^ ^ c o n s t r u e A 
inis chapter is declared "oh 
relief from uncertainty and ,ns J u n t o w l ' 1 3 P U r P ° S e * ' " M t t l e a n d <° afford 
•e,a. regions, and „ „
 b e ^ ^ S S ^ f - •*£ 
History L. 1951. ch ^s s -i /-. 
Supp.. 104-33-!2. 0 S ' * 2 ' C- 1W3. Cross-References rn • 
utes. * 68.3 ? ~ Construction of stat-t s, •} S-  2 
-VOTES TO DECISIONS 
A.I\(.rSla 
Aooncabilitv * ? ? ± . W 0 " l d J 0 ™™* to affect the pvbhc 
A p P j - b ^ ^ ^ f g * La,e Count, Atty 1 9 ^ t f ^ d 
fac: ^ » h e ™ ? , S ! S ^ 7 X a ^ £ * D l s ™ 3 ^ of c o m p l a i n c . 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. -Jur 2d ~>n \ \ r 
- , - e n , » 9, 10~ ' " ~d * * « » * ^ C.J.S. - 26 C J 3 Declarator,
 J u a ? n l e n t 3 
78-33-13. "Person" defined. 
any person, P a r t n e r s I ^ o T n t T o l - 0 / ^ C h a p t e r ' 3 h a i l b e c°^trued to mean 
History: L. 1951,
 c h 5>! M r-
Supp.. 104-33-13. Ch- ° 8 ' * 1 : C- 1M3. P a r t n e r s , T.tle US 
^ l U f a ^ _ Corporations Title 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J u r 2d. — >?_. .. _ - , , „ 
* x 2 ; . : o e n D e d a r a t o r " JMJaents 
661 
'.80.070 Riding rules and regulations-Unlawful acts. 
is unlawful for operators of bicycles: 
When riding upcn a sidewalk to fail to yield the right-of-way to pedestrians and sound a 
warning device before overtaking or passing any pedestrian; 
. To ride more than two abreast upon any street: 
.. To proceed other than single file upon any sidewalk; 
i To c-rrv extra passenoers or carry any packages, bundles or articles which would require 
' the removal of the hand or hands from the handlebars OT the bicycle; 
:. To permit the bicycle such operator is riding to be towed by another vehicle or bicycle; 
: To rde any bicycle upon any sidewalk within the central traffic district, as defined in Section 
' 19 0* 090 of this title, or its successor, and as described in Schedule 1 of this title, set out 
in~ChaD*er 12 104, or its successor, and made a part hereof by reference, or on any other 
area where prohibited by signs, provided, however, the foregoing shall not apply to police 
officers in the scope and course of their employment; 
3. To carry more persons at a time than the number for which the bicycle is designed to cam/ 
on seats firmly attached thereto; 
-i When ridina upon a roadway marked with a bicycle lane to rice upcn the sidewalk or any 
" portion of the roadway outside the marked bicycle lane except when making a leu turn; 
I T- rid= uoon the left-hand side of any street, except when they are within a marked bicycle 
raneor when riding upon a one-way street. (Ord. 16-39 § 1, 1989; prior code Title 4 . , Art. 
13 §273) 
